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Abstract 
When China’s accession to the WTO exposed European ﬁrms to import competition, they responded 
by increasing their investment in innovation. This response was stronger in industries and ﬁrms where 
factors of production were less mobile. Motivated by this evidence, we incorporate “trapped factors” 
at the micro level into a general equilibrium model of product-cycle trade and growth. In a calibrated 
version of the model that starts with a baseline growth rate of 2%, trade integration between the 
OECD and low-wage countries can increase the steady-state growth rate to 2.4% per year. Factors that 
are trapped at a ﬁrm by an unexpected change in trade policy do not change this long-run growth rate, 
but in the medium run, they could have a noticeable e↵ect on aggregate growth. Simulations of the 
model show that in the ﬁrst decade after liberalization, growth jumps to 2.7% per year and that 
trapped factors account for almost all of the 0.3% = 2.7% − 2.4% increase above the steady state 
growth rate. 
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1 Introduction
Ever since Adam Smith published The Wealth of Nations, economists have debated the
sign and magnitude of the gains from trade. Participants in these debates have long rec-
ognized that the static gains could be dwarfed by dynamic e↵ects. Recent evidence from
the empirical micro-literature suggests that trade can indeed have a large positive impact
on innovation and productivity.1 Likewise, some reduced form macro-empirical estimates
also suggest that trade can have a large impact on the level of national income or its rate of
growth.2 One puzzle, however, is that in calibrated general equilibrium models the quan-
titative estimates of the welfare e↵ects of trade still appear small. A typical calculation
suggests that for a nation like the United States, a move from complete autarky to current
levels of trade implies a gain of a few percentage points of GDP.3A possible reason for this
is that the calibrations are based on static models that do not allow for the dynamic e↵ects
of endogenous innovation on growth.
In this context, we craft a model to match recent evidence showing that the firms in
Europe that faced more direct competition from China’s low-wage exports undertook bigger
increases in product innovation.4 To match this empirical response, our model lets firms
choose how much to invest in developing new products and processes. In the spirit of models
of endogenous growth,5 the model requires that all increases in productivity come from these
firm-level investments in innovation. As a result, it makes it possible to trace the e↵ects
that a modest change in trade policy has on innovation through to the implied change in
the aggregate rate of growth, taking full account of general equilibrium interactions. The
model confirms the intuition that the dynamic gains from trade can be large, substantially
larger than other comparable exercises suggest.
The challenge in capturing the micro-empirical evidence is to explain why a firm that
1See for example Pavcnik (2002) on Chile, Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) for the US, Amiti and Konings
(2006) on Indonesia, Goldberg et al. (2010) looking at imports in India, Lileeva and Trefler (2010) on export
induced upgrading in Canada, Aw, Roberts and Xu (2011) on Taiwan, de Loecker (2011) on Belgium, and
Bustos (2011) on Argentina.
2See, for example, Frankel and Romer (1999), or case studies such as Romer (1992) on the e↵ect of an Export
Processing Zone in Mauritius, Bernhofen, and Brown (2005) on post-Meiji Japan, Trefler (2004) on CAFTA,
Feyrer (2013) on the Suez Canal, or Irwin (2005) on the Je↵erson embargo.
3For example, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2013, Table 1) calculate that moving the US from current
levels of trade to autarky would cause only a small loss of welfare of about 2% of GDP. Moving to a multi-
sector model increases these to about 4% (Eaton and Kortum, 2012, have an estimate of 5%). The welfare
calculations in Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2013) are based on the trade elasticity combined with the
import share of GDP (see also Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare, 2012). Melitz and Redding (2015)
show that in a heterogeneous firm model, these are not su cient statistics for calculating welfare gains.
They find that reducing trade costs from current US levels, has larger welfare e↵ects in their more structural
approach. Note that in each of these cases, larger welfare e↵ects of trade can be generated by allowing for
traded intermediates or by focusing on more open economies than the US.
4Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen (2015).
5See for example, Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992), and Grossman and Helpman (1991).
is more exposed to import competition from China has a bigger incentive to develop new
goods. We show within our model that this pattern is precisely what one would expect
if factors of production are temporarily “trapped” within firms due to moving costs. If,
for example, skilled engineers develop firm-specific or industry-specific knowledge and are
expensive to train and then lay-o↵, a negative demand shock to a good they helped produce
leaves them in the firm but reduces their opportunity cost. Under this scenario, the firm
innovates after the trade shock not just because the value of a newly designed product has
gone up for the market as a whole, but also because the opportunity cost of designing and
producing the product have gone down within that firm.
This interpretation of trapped factors is consistent with some existing empirical evi-
dence that firms shift resources out of activities that compete with imports from low-wage
countries.6 The idea is also born out in many case studies of international trade in which
firms respond to import competition from a low-wage nation by developing an entirely new
type of good that will be less vulnerable to this type of competition.7 However, before
embedding our notion of trapped factors into the model, we go further to empirically test
its plausibility.
We exploit a micro-level database, first constructed in Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen
(2015), on European firms’ patenting rates and exposure to Chinese import competition
over the period of intense trade liberalization in the late 1990s and early 2000s. To test
our model’s micro-level mechanism, we construct various proxies for the level of input
adjustment costs or trapped factors within firms such as industry-specific wage premia.
In the data, patent growth is higher for firms in industries with higher levels of Chinese
import growth, but this e↵ect is stronger for firms with higher levels of our proxies for
trapped factors. This is the correlation between patenting and trapped factors that the
model predicts.
In addition to this trapped-factor e↵ect of trade on innovation, the model allows for
the independent e↵ect that a more integrated world market has on the steady-state growth
rate (a “market size” e↵ect). A reduction in trade barriers increases purchasing power
in the South, which increases the profit that a Northern firm can earn from sales there.
In contrast to the e↵ect of trapped-factors on innovation, which arises only at firms that
face direct competition from low-wage imports, this increase in potential profits causes an
6See for example, Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006).
7For example, Freeman and Kleiner (2005) report that when a large American shoe firm was faced with rising
imports of cheap shoes from China it abandoned production of mass-market mens’ shoes. But, rather than
simply close its factory the firm introduced new types of shoes for smaller niche markets, using its newly idle
engineers to help develop these and its idle production line to produce these. For example, one new product
was a batch of boots with metal hoops in the soles that made it easier for workers to rapidly climb ladders,
ordered by a local construction firm. The design for these boots earned a patent. All of this occurred because
the abandonment of the production line for mass market shoes in response to Chinese competition, which
left its engineers temporarily free to innovate new shoes.
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increase in the rate of innovation at all Northern firms, and is therefore harder to identify
from micro-data. It is an incremental version of the scale e↵ect on growth that has been
examined in models of trade with endogenous growth based on a binary comparison of two
isolated economies versus a single fully integrated economy.8 This mechanism has not, to
our knowledge, been investigated in a model that is rich enough to be used in a calibration.
At a minimum, such a model must allow a comparison across equilibria with a continuum
of degrees of openness. In a sensitivity analysis, we also verify that over a time horizon
of roughly a century, the conclusions from our endogenous growth model are similar to
alternative calibrations based on a model of semi-endogenous growth (like that of Jones,
1995a,b) in which a policy change can have a prolonged e↵ect on the growth rate even
though the asymptotic change in the growth rate in such models is always zero.
In our product-cycle model, innovation in the North produces new intermediate inputs
that are used by firms in both the North and the South. In a steady-state equilibrium, trade
barriers prevent factor-price equalization, so goods produced in the South have an absolute
cost advantage. We find in a calibrated quantitative experiment that the increased global
integration of the OECD with all low-wage countries that took place during the decade
around China’s accession to the WTO increases the long-run rate of growth in the OECD
from 2.0% per year to almost 2.4% per year. Of this increase, approximately one half, or
0.2%, can be attributed to China by alone.
Of course, small increases in growth can generate substantial improvements in welfare.
This increase in the rate of growth from trade with the South has a welfare e↵ect that
would be equivalent to increasing consumption by 16%. Of this increase in consumption,
14% is from the increased profitability of innovation and 2% is from the trapped-factor
e↵ect. Although the trapped-factors mechanism has a smaller long-run welfare e↵ect, it
will have extra salience because the e↵ect is front-loaded. Over the first decade after the
trade shock, the trapped-factor e↵ect on the rate of growth is similar in magnitude to the
market-size e↵ect. For trade with all low-wage countries, the trapped-factor e↵ect increases
the rate of growth by an additional 0.3% per year (i.e. the combined e↵ect of the market
size and trapped factors e↵ects raises the growth rate from 2.0% to 2.7% per year) in the
first decade after the liberalization, with about one-third being due to China alone.
Although these magnitudes may appear large in light of the subsequent slowdown in
global and Chinese growth in recent years, it is important to emphasize that we are focusing
purely on trade e↵ects rather than business cycle fluctuations or transitional growth in
developing economies. We therefore calibrate based on frontier growth data preceding the
global crisis of 2008-9, and we leave to future work the possibility that such large cyclical
fluctuations may have long-lasting e↵ects on income. Given the potentially large positive
8See for example, Grossman and Helpman (1990) and Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991).
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e↵ects on innovation we find from integration with emerging economies like China, our
findings strike a more positive note on the future of frontier growth than, say, Gordon
(2012). However, the main implications of our model hold both in the baseline model with
permanent increases in growth from liberalization as well as in a semi-endogenous version
of the model with no permanent impact on growth rates.
Our results connect to several other lines of work. To simplify the analysis, the model
allows for heterogeneity among firms only in the degree of import competition that they
face. One natural extension would allow for other dimensions of heterogeneity (e.g. Melitz
and Redding, 2013).9 We also assume that firms operate in only one region, so another
natural extension would allow for multinational firms that manage R&D and production
in both the North and South (see Antras and Yeaple, 2013 for an overview of the evidence
and theory in this area). In a model of growth based on di↵usion of heterogeneous stocks
of existing knowledge that is complementary to our model based on innovation, Perla,
Tonetti, and Waugh (2012) find that trade liberalization can encourage more firms with
low productivity to seek out interaction with high productivity firms from whom they can
learn. Because the gains from di↵usion are never exhausted, faster di↵usion in this setting
can also, at least in some cases, lead to a permanently faster rate of growth. Recent papers
have also considered the interaction between di↵usion and heterogeneity.10 Our estimates
are conservative in the sense that all these extensions are likely to generate additional gains
from trade.
Our paper connects not just to the general literature cited above on the welfare e↵ects of
trade, but also on those papers that look specifically at the impact of trade with China (e.g.
Ossa and Hsieh, 2010). Because of concern about increased inequality, an older literature
on the distributional e↵ects of trade that arise when labor is industry-specific (e.g. Mussa,
1974) is generating renewed interest (Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2013). In such models, the
gains from trade for some groups are o↵set by welfare losses for others. As we note below,
the optimistic conclusions from our analysis of the gains from trade need to be tempered
if a trade liberalization increases inequality. Relative to the existing literature, in which
specific factors do not imply e ciency gains, in our second-best model, trapped factors can
generate additional welfare gains when there are unexpected increases in trade.
The model of innovation spurred by a reduction in the opportunity cost of the inputs used
in innovation is reminiscent of the old idea that trade competition reduces X-ine ciency. We
9Atkeson and Burstein (2010) consider a heterogeneous firm trade model with endogenous process innovation.
They find that reductions in trade costs lead to no greater increases in welfare in such models compared to
homogeneous firm models. Like Atkeson and Burstein (2010) we also find that the steady-state increase in
welfare is determined by the insight from the older literature that larger market size increases the returns
to product innovation. Unlike them, however, we generate more growth in the transition to the new steady
state due to our new trapped factor e↵ect.
10See for example Sampson (2014) or Costantini and Melitz (2008).
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generate such e↵ects without appealing to the type of principal-agent models (e.g. Schmidt,
1997) that de Loecker and Goldberg (2014) have recently questioned. Finally, our structure,
in which firms take advantage of a negative shock by investing in innovation, is similar in
spirit to business cycle theories about the “virtues of bad times” described by Aghion and
Saint-Paul (1998) or Hall (1991).
The road map to the rest of the paper is as follows. We start by introducing empirical
evidence in Section 2 which links trade liberalization and innovation to our notion of trapped
factors. Section 3 presents our baseline model of trade and long-term growth, laying out
our framework for trade shocks in fully mobile and trapped factors cases. Section 4 moves
on to the quantitative exercise, and Section 5 o↵ers some extensions and robustness tests.
Section 6 concludes. A set of online appendices contain many technical details of the
theoretical proofs (A), the data and model calibration (B), the model solution method (C),
an extension to a semi-endogenous growth approach (D), an extension to an alternative
R&D cost function (E), and an extension to an economy with Southern innovation (F).
2 Trade Shocks, Innovation, and Trapped Factors in the Data
In the last few decades, developed economies have dramatically liberalized trade with de-
veloping nations with much lower wages. To illustrate the magnitude of this change, we
classify nations into non-OECD and OECD groups. Imports from non-OECD group into
the OECD group nearly doubled from 3.9% of OECD GDP in 1997 to around 7.0% in 2006.
In Figure 1 the black line with circle markers plots this import-to-GDP ratio for each year
in the period. China’s individual role, operating through channels such as Chinese WTO
accession in 2001, seems particularly important. In the blue line with triangles, Figure 1
displays the ratio of Chinese imports to OECD GDP over the same period. Chinese imports
grew from 0.79% to 2.4%, representing over half of the total increase in low-wage imports
into the developed world.11 We conclude that not only was the recent trade liberalization
toward low-cost countries large, but also that any analysis of this liberalization must give
central importance to understanding the e↵ects of increased trade with China on the world
economy.
Within individual firms and industries in rich nations, one might expect that the entry
of competitors like China with lower costs and tremendous scale would lead to convulsive
e↵ects. Empirically, firms surviving the onslaught of import competition do indeed exhibit
substantive changes in their activities. Perhaps surprisingly, however, firms appear to shift
towards innovation. In Italy, Bugamelli et al. (2010) show that a range of manufacturers
11These ten years from 1997-2006 were chosen to evenly bracket Chinese WTO accession in 2001. The
aggregate data in Figure 1 comes from a combination of trade figures from the OECD-STAN database with
GDP figures from the Penn World Table. Appendix B contains more information on the data construction.
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Figure 1: Import Ratios are Increasing
Note: Non-OECD and Chinese imports into OECD countries are from the OECD-STAN
database as available in April 2013. Chinese import data is directly available, and non-
OECD imports are imputed as the di↵erence between world imports and imports from
other OECD members in a given year. The normalizing GDP measure for the OECD is
computed from the Penn World Tables version 7.1 and equals the sum of GDP for all OECD
members in a given year. The Chinese imports to OECD GDP ratio in 1997 is 0.79% and
in 2006 is 2.4%. The total non-OECD imports to OECD GDP ratio in 1997 is 3.9% and in
2006 is 7.0%.
from ceramic tiles to women’s clothing switched to more innovative high-end products in
response to rising low-wage competition. Relatedly, Freeman and Kleiner (2005) showed in
a case study that US shoe manufacturers switched from making low-cost mass market shoes
to innovative products when faced with Chinese competition. This response presents an
obvious challenge for economic theory. If it was in the firm’s interest to invest in innovation
after the shock, why was it not in its interest to do so before the shock?
Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2015) o↵ers systematic evidence of innovation in Euro-
pean firms in the face of Chinese import competition. Those authors construct a database
combining three main sources of information on European firms: 1) firm-level accounting
statements on employment, sales, wage bills, capital, and materials spanning 12 countries
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from 1996-2005 and drawn from the Bureau Van Dijk Amadeus database, 2) matched firm-
level patent data from the European Patent O ce, and 3) disaggregated trade flows at the
four-digit industry level from the UN Comtrade database. All together, these data sources
lead to a panel including innovation and trade measures for over 8,000 firms spanning around
1,500 country-industry pairs and containing over 30,000 firm-year observations. We make
use of the same database. For more details, see Appendix B.
Column 1 of Table 1 replicates findings in the previous paper, presenting an OLS regres-
sion of innovation as measured by the five-year change in patenting   ln(PATENTS)ijkt on
the corresponding five-year change in Chinese imports   IMPCHjkt , measured as the ratio of
Chinese imports to total imports in the same industry by country cell. We also control for
country-year dummies:12
 ln(PATENTS)ijkt = ↵ IMP
CH
jkt + fkt + ⌫ijkt
The resulting value of ↵ˆ is positive and precisely estimated. A 10% increase in Chinese
imports within a country-industry pair over is associated with around 3.2% more patenting
at the firm level. Instrumenting the change in imports with WTO-related abolition of
industry-specific quotas against China leads to qualitatively similar results.
Before we build our trapped factors model, we extend the existing empirical work to
investigate this channel. In particular, we build two proxies for the strength of trapped
factors: industry-specific wage premia and the level of firm TFP. Intuitively, wage premia
may represent the rents from specificity in human capital inputs within industries. Here,
industry-specific wage premia are measured as the coe cients on three-digit industry dum-
mies in wage regressions using pooled cross sections of workers in the United Kingdom’s
Labor Force Survey from 1996 to 2007 (e.g. Krueger and Summers, 1988). We chose the UK
because it has the most liberalized labor market in Europe, and we want our trapped factor
measure to represent underlying economic forces rather than country-specific institutional
features such as union power. Column 2 of Table 1 reports estimates from the specification
in Column 1 augmented with the level of our wage premia proxy for trapped factors and
its interaction with the change in Chinese imports. Firms in industries with higher wage
premia exhibit a significantly stronger positive association between the change in patenting
and increased Chinese imports.
Our second measure uses the calculation of measured firm-level TFP that might reflect
the accumulated e↵ect of investments in firm-specific inputs that are not easily transferable
12As discussed in detail in Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2015), the baseline association between innovation
and Chinese import growth is robust to a range of alternative horizons for computing changes, alternative
patent-based measures of innovation, and alternative normalizations of Chinese imports on domestic product
or apparent consumption.
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across firms. Since we measure only observable factor inputs and not the firm specific
component, the conventional approach of deducting outputs from weighted inputs will mean
that measured TFP is higher for companies with more firm-specific capital (see Appendix
B for details).13 For example, if firm-specific human capital is important and we measure
just the number of workers, measured TFP will be much higher in those firms who have
more firm-specific human capital.
We use the level of measured firm TFP in period t-5 before the start of the five-year
changes in Chinese imports.14 Measurement of TFP relies upon estimating separate pro-
duction functions at the two-digit sector level using the de Loecker (2011) method. To do
this, we must have data on capital, labor and materials inputs. Since materials inputs are
not a mandatory item that needs to be reported in company accounts for all European coun-
tries, we focus on the four nations where materials are well reported - France, Italy, Spain
and Sweden. Moving to this sub-sample, Column 3 re-estimates the baseline specification
linking patenting to Chinese import growth. The link between patenting and Chinese im-
ports is somewhat smaller but robustly positive and precisely estimated. Column 4 reveals
that firms with higher levels of TFP exhibit a stronger association between patenting and
Chinese import growth, again with a precisely estimated coe cient on the interaction.
Overall, the change in European firm-level patenting during the recent period of in-
creased trade liberalization is consistent with a meaningful role for trapped factors. Not
only is patenting higher in industries with more exposure to Chinese import competition, but
this relationship appears to be strongest within industries that have more input specificity.
This evidence is only suggestive because the measures of trapped factors could potentially
reflect other forces than trapped factors. Nevertheless, the empirical findings motivate a
deeper investigation of whether a coherent equilibrium model of endogenous growth can be
constructed to interpret the patterns in the micro and macro data. We next turn to this
task.
3 A Model of Trade and Growth
In this section we first describe the basic structure of the model for a closed economy. This
lets us discuss the technology and highlight the key forces in the model. We then introduce
product-cycle trade into the model between an innovating Northern economy and a low-cost
Southern economy. We develop the open-economy model in two steps. First we compare
steady-state growth with di↵erent levels of trade between the North and South. Then we
13The method of using measured TFP as a proxy for the “wedge” due to adjustment costs, specific capital
and other frictions is in the same spirit as Hsieh and Klenow (2009).
14The required calculation of TFP before the first period of five-year changes expands the sample window
backwards by one year in Table 1 columns 3 and 4.
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turn to the transition dynamics between steady-states that arise after an unexpected trade
liberalization. We introduce trapped factors in this second stage because they a↵ect the
transition dynamics of the model, not the steady state.
3.1 Technology
There are two types of inputs in production, human capital and a variety of produced
intermediate inputs. At any date, these inputs can be used in three di↵erent productive
activities: producing final consumption goods, producing new physical units of the interme-
diate inputs that will be used in production in the next period, and producing new designs
or patents. We assume that the two types of inputs are used with the same factor intensities
in these three activities, so we can use the simplifying device of speaking of the production
first of final output in a final goods sector, and then the allocation of final output to the
production of consumption goods, intermediate inputs, or new patented designs. We can
also speak of final output as the numeraire, with the understanding that it is in fact the
bundle of inputs that produces one unit of final output that is actually the numeraire good.
With this convention, we can write final output Yt in period t, as the following func-
tion of human capital H and intermediate goods xjt, where j is drawn from the range of
intermediate inputs that have already been invented, j 2 [0, At] :
Yt = H
↵
AtZ
0
x1 ↵jt dj (1)
Using the convention noted above, which broadly follows that in Romer (1987), we can
speak of firms in period t devoting a total quantity Zt of final output to the production of
new patented designs that will increase the existing stock of designs At to the value that
will be available next period, At+1. If we let Ct denote final consumption goods, final output
is divided as follows:
Yt = Ct +Kt+1 + Zt
= Ct +
At+1Z
0
xjt+1dj + Zt
The intermediate inputs are like capital that fully depreciates after one period of use, an
assumption that is made more palatable by our later calibrated choice of a period that is
10 years long.
The key equation for the dynamics of the model describes the conversion of foregone
output or R&D expenditures Zt into new patents. In period t, each of a large number
10
N of intermediate goods firms indexed by f can use final goods to discover new types of
intermediate goods that can then be produced for use in t+1. LetMt+1 denote the aggregate
measure of new goods discovered in period t, and let Mft+1 be the measure of these new
goods produced at firm f . Here, the letterM is a mnemonic for “monopoly” because goods
patented in period t will be subject to monopoly pricing in period t + 1. Because our
patents, like our capital, last for only one period, only the new designs produced in period
t will be subject to monopoly pricing in period t + 1. These assumptions imply that our
model period of e↵ective monopoly protection, 10 years, is somewhat shorter than the full
length of statutory patent protection in the United States, a notion consistent with a range
of empirical papers including Budish, Roin, and Williams (2015).
To allow for the problem that firms face in coordinating search and innovation in larger
teams, we allow for a form of diminishing marginal productivity for the inputs to innovation
in any given period. Let Zft denote the resources devoted to R&D or innovation at firm f
at time t. We assume that the output of new designs will also depend on the availability of
all the ideas represented by the entire stock of existing innovations, At. Hence we can write
the number of new designs at firm f as:
Mft+1 = (Zft)
⇢A1 ⇢t , (2)
where 0 < ⇢ < 1.
The exponent on At is crucial to the long-term dynamics of the model. The choice here,
1  ⇢, makes it possible for an economy with a fixed quantity of human capital H to grow
at a constant rate that will depend on other parameters in the model. As an alternative,
we could follow the suggestion in Jones (1995b) and use a smaller value for this exponent,
in which case we could generate steady-state growth by allowing for growth in the quantity
of H. The two types of model o↵er di↵erent very long-run (100+ year) predictions about
the e↵ect that the trade shock on growth, but are similar for the first ⇡ 100 years, which
because of discounting is e↵ectively all that matters for our results. We formally detail and
calibrate an extension of our model with semi-endogenous growth and show the results are
very similar (see Appendix D).
Another way to characterize the production process for new designs is to convert the
innovation production function in equation (2) to a cost function that exhibits increasing
marginal costs of innovation in period t,
Zft = ⌫M
 
ft+1A
1  
t , (3)
where   = 1⇢ > 1 and ⌫ is an innocuously introduced scaling parameter.
Given the innovation cost function for a single intermediate goods firm f , the aggregate
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R&D expenditure is immediately given by Zt =
PN
f=1 Zft. By symmetry and a choice of
units that determines the value of ⌫, this simplifies to
Zt =
1
 
M t+1A
1  
t . (4)
It follows from equation (1) that output will be proportional to At. Equation (4) then
implies that allocating a constant fraction of output to the production of new designs will
generate a constant exponential rate of growth of A. When coupled with standard CRRA
preferences, standard arguments reviewed in Appendix A show that this economy has an
equilibrium that exhibits steady-state growth at a constant exponential rate.
3.2 Open Economy
Next, suppose that there are two integrated economic regions, North and South. We treat
the North as the home country and denote Southern variables with an asterisk. There are
identical representative households in the North and South. The final goods technologies
of the two regions are identical, but only Northern intermediate goods firms have access to
the innovation technology that produces new patents or designs. A firm in the South can
subsequently produce any intermediate good as soon is it is o↵ patent.
We show in an extension of the model in Appendix F that allowing for an empirically
calibrated level of Southern innovation yields qualitatively similar results. However, no
Southern innovation, our baseline assumption, is actually a realistic approximation to the
data if we identify the North with OECD nations empirically. As plotted in Appendix
Figure B1, patents granted in the US are overwhelmingly from OECD nations. Although
non-OECD innovation as measured by patenting is increasing rapidly, the increase is from
an extremely low base. For example, China in particular accounts for an average of 0.06%
of US patents during 1977-2006.15
To allow for a continuum of possible levels of trade liberalization, we assume that the
government in the North imposes a trade restriction which allows only a proportion   of o↵-
patent intermediate goods varieties produced in the South to be imported into the North.
If we make the simplifying assumption that the goods with the lowest index values are the
ones that are allowed to trade, then Figure 2 describes the goods that are used in production
in the North and the South. The goods with the lowest index values are called I goods
to signal that they are imported into the North. In terms of production in period t, the
range of the I goods is from 0 to  At 1. These goods are produced in the South for use in
the South and for import into the North. Next come the R (for restricted) goods. These
15Chinese and non-OECD patenting rates remain extremely low relative to the OECD. Note, however, that
Puga and Trefler (2010) raise the possibility that low-wage countries may be increasingly participating in
“incremental innovation” abstracted from in this paper.
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Figure 2: A Product Cycle in the Model
Note: The figure plots the product cycle for intermediate goods in the open-economy model.
In the open-economy equilibrium defined and analyzed in the paper, goods in each period
will display the above decomposition, into newly innovated M goods produced solely in the
North, perfectly competitive but non-traded R goods produced in the North and the South,
and perfectly competitive, traded I goods produced solely in the South. The vertical axis
plots a stylized version of the equilibrium intensive margin for each class of good.
are produced in the North for use in the North and produced in the South for use in the
South. Finally, we have the M (for monopoly) goods, which are produced in the North and
used in production in both the North and the South. Hence, Mt represents the new goods
developed in period t 1 for sale in period t; Rt represents the trade-restricted but o↵-patent
goods available for use in production in period t; It represents the o↵-patent goods that can
be imported into the North for use in period t. In a small abuse of the notation, we will
use the symbols I, R, and M to denote both the set of goods and its measure.
In this two economy model, we can consider a unit of final output, or equivalently the
bundle of inputs that produces it, in both the South and the North. We will use output in
the North as the numeraire and define the Southern terms of trade qt as the price in units
of final output in the North of one unit of final output produced in the South. We impose
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trade balance in each period so there is no borrowing between North and South. Along any
steady-state growth path, the interest rates in the North and South will be the same, but
the restriction on borrowing is binding during the short transition to the new steady-state
growth rate that follows a policy change. The terms of trade qt adjust to achieve trade
balance in each period, which requires that the value of imports into the North, pItItxIt, is
equal to the value of the goods that the North sells to the South, pMtMtx⇤Mt.
As in the usual product-cycle model, e.g. Krugman (1979), we are interested only in the
case in which the South has a cost advantage in producing goods that it can export, due
to its lower wages. On the steady-state growth path, this is equivalent to having qt < 1. In
our analysis, we restrict attention to the case of values of the trade policy parameter   that
are low enough to ensure that this restriction holds.
It is important for the operation of the model that in this case, trade balance does
not lead to factor price equalization. Identical workers in the North and the South earn
wages that when converted at the terms of trade q are higher in the North and lower in
the South. Restricted intermediate inputs that are produced and used only in the South
are less expensive there than the same goods produced and used in the North. However,
because consumption goods in the South are also less expensive, the di↵erence in the wages
is much smaller after a PPP correction.
Proposition 1 establishes a two-equation characterization of the steady-state growth rate
and the associated terms of trade as functions of the trade parameter  , with further details
in Appendix A. Note that we use   to denote the consumer risk aversion and   to refer to
the consumer discount rate. Also, we define ⌦ = ↵(1  ↵) 2 ↵↵ and  = (1  ↵)↵ 12 ↵ .
Proposition 1 Open-Economy Steady-State Growth Path
For low enough values of the trade parameter  , the world economy follows a steady-state
growth path with a common, constant growth rate of varieties, worldwide output, and con-
sumption in each region. The growth rate g( ) and the terms of trade q( ) are determined
by the zero marginal profit condition for innovation
g( )  1 = ⌦ 
1
↵ (1 + g( )) 
 
↵
⇣
H + q( )
1
↵H⇤
⌘
(5)
and the balanced trade condition
q( ) =
✓
 H
g( )H⇤
◆ ↵
2 ↵
 (6)
with q( ) < 1. Proof in Appendix A.
After substitution of equation (6) into equation (5), the growth rate g( ) can be seen to
be determined by the intersection of a downward sloping innovation marginal profit curve
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Figure 3: Steady-State Growth Path Equilibrium
Note: The figure plots the equilibrium innovation optimality condition for Northern in-
termediate goods firms in the steady-state growth path of the open-economy model. The
innovation optimality condition pins down steady-state growth path growth rates in this
framework, and as implied by Proposition 1 increases in the returns to innovation induced
by increases in   lead to strictly higher long-run growth rates.
with an upward sloping innovation marginal cost curve. For clarity, see Figure 3 which
plots a stylized version of the equilibrium innovation optimality condition and the result in
Proposition 1. The marginal profit of innovation is strictly increasing in the trade openness
parameter  , so the the open economy steady-state growth rate is strictly increasing in  .
This implies that the terms of trade q( ) is also strictly increasing in  .
Proposition 1 is an important result as it establishes that trade liberalization will increase
growth rates as it increases the incentive to invest in innovation. Essentially this is because
the e↵ective size of the market has expanded and this increases the profitability for new
goods. R&D investments increase until at the margin ex-ante expected profits are again
zero, but this will be at a higher growth rate.
In a standard closed economy growth model of this type, an increase in the stock of
human capital leads to a higher growth rate. Here the growth rate depends on the term
H + q( )
1
↵H⇤ which is proportional to the demand for any input and hence the profit that
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it will generate. The worldwide demand for newly invented goods in the North depends on
demand in the North, which is proportional to H, and on demand from the South, which
is proportional to H⇤ but includes a downward adjustment induced by the terms of trade.
The long-run mechanics of the model are straightforward. A trade liberalization caused
by an increase in   leads to an increased flow of o↵-patent I goods from South to North. In
order to balance trade flows in the face of this shift, the Southern terms of trade q increase.
Therefore, Southern I goods become more expensive in the North, while newly innovated
NorthernM goods become cheaper when purchased in the South. The result is higher sales
of M goods in the South, as well as higher overall profits at the margin for new Northern
innovations. In response, innovation expenditures and growth rates increase.
3.3 Trade Shocks
The open economy analysis above characterized the constant perfect foresight growth rate
associated with a constant value of the parameter  . Next, we start from a steady-state
growth path trade with trade policy   and consider the e↵ects of an unanticipated and
permanent trade shock to a more liberal trade regime with  0 >  . To carry this exercise
out, we must be more explicit about the timing of decisions relative to the announcement
of the change in  .
First, it helps to think more concretely about the relationship between the trade restric-
tion   and the measure of varieties produced at each intermediate goods firm in the North.
When   is constant, a constant fraction of the o↵-patent goods that each intermediate input
firm in the North had previously produced under trade protection are exposed to import
competition in each period. In the aggregate, the total stock of goods that are available
as imports in period t is equal to   times the o↵-patent goods in period t, or  At 1. For
simplicity, we assume that this process of exposure is evenly distributed across all interme-
diate input producing firms. For firm f, this means that if it had a set of goods Af that it
produced last period with measure m(Af ), in the current period, it will produce a measure
of goods equal to (1   )m(Af ) +m(Mf ) where Mf is the set of new goods that it invents.
Firms can take account of the predictable shrinkage in the goods that they can produce
when they make their decisions about how much of each type of input to acquire.
In contrast, if a government mandates for period 1 an unanticipated increase in   to
 0, there will be a jump in the number of goods that are subject to import competition.
At the aggregate level, the measure of goods which unexpectedly become unprofitable for
Northern firms is A0( 0    ).
To match the micro data, which indicates that some firms are exposed to larger trade
shocks than others, we want to allow for the possibility that this range of goods A0( 0   )
is not equally distributed among all firms. To do this, we split the set of intermediate
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input producing firms in the North into two groups of equal size. We refer to these as the
“Shocked” and “No Shock” firms. We assume that all the goods that are unexpectedly
exposed to competition from imports are goods that were previously manufactured by the
Shocked firms.
With these preliminaries in mind, Figure 4 presents the timeline of events within the
period of a trade shock. The trade shock is announced at period 0 and becomes e↵ective
in period 1. We present two alternative sets of assumptions. In the first case, the “Fully
Mobile” economy, firms can change their input decisions to accommodate the lost R goods
production because their input demand choices are made after the new trade policy  0 is
announced by Northern policymakers. By contrast, in the “Trapped Factors” case, we as-
sume that firms make their input choices before the announcement of the new trade policy.
Furthermore, we assume that all inputs, i.e. a bundle of both human capital and interme-
diates embodied in final output, are trapped within firms in the period of a trade shock.
Inputs are trapped because of adjustment costs preventing re-assignment either across firms
or into released consumption. The timing of events across the two alternative assumptions
is otherwise identical. Furthermore, in all periods before and after the trade shock in period
0, realized policy is identical to anticipated policy and no adjustment frictions bind in either
economy.16
It is worth pausing here to discuss the plausibility of our Trapped Factors assumption
in more detail. In essence, we assume that adjustment costs trapping inputs within firms
are entirely prohibitive or infinite in magnitude. While convenient analytically and for
exposition, this is not required for our quantitative results. As we will highlight in the
next section, the shadow value of inputs falls only by around 26% for the most heavily
a↵ected Shocked firms in our Trapped Factors economy in the face of a calibrated trade
shock. Therefore, alternative finite levels of input specificity or other adjustment costs
in a generalized version of the model would need only to be able to prevent adjustment
in the face of moderate shifts in the internal value of inputs. Structural studies of input
adjustment costs routinely yield empirical estimates much higher than this, e.g. around
35% irreversibility in the case of tangible capital inputs in Bloom (2009), so we find our
adjustment cost assumption to be entirely plausible.
In order to calculate the full general equilibrium e↵ects of a trade shock, we must
take into account not only impact e↵ects on input demands but also any induced changes
in interest rates and the terms of trade. The full equilibrium definitions for the closed
economy, the open economy, and the trade shock economies can be found in Appendix A.
16Note also that in both the Fully Mobile and Trapped Factors economies, a sudden increase in imports from
the South requires the immediate takeover of these production lines by Southern intermediate goods firms.
We assume that in both cases, Southern intermediate firms anticipate the trade shock to allow for the sudden
export jump.
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Figure 4: Timing of a Trade Shock
Note: This figure lays out the timing of trade shock announcement in the model. The upper
timeline describes the assumptions of the Fully Mobile economy, and the bottom timeline
describes the assumptions of the Trapped Factors model.
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Before moving to the quantitative analysis, we also note that the description above is
based upon an assumption that competition within the market for each o↵-patent variety
takes place between only the intermediate goods firm which innovated that variety and a
competitive fringe for that variety. In particular, another innovating firm cannot compete
within the o↵-patent market of another intermediate goods firm, implying that any firms
a↵ected by a trade shock need simply to determine their input allocation between innovation
of new varieties and production of their own remaining o↵-patent varieties. Given that our
trapped factors timing assumption can be equivalently reframed as an assumption of input
specificity, such a partition is natural.17
4 Quantitative Analysis: OECD Trade Liberalization with
Non-OECD Countries
We can now calibrate and perform a quantitative exercise with the model, considering the
impact of a trade shock over a full transition path. Appendices B and C give more details
on the calibration and solution.
First, as mentioned above, we assume a model period of 10 years. Then, we calibrate the
model economy to match long-run growth rates, and movements in trade flows between the
OECD and non-OECD countries from 1997-2006, the ten-year window surrounding Chinese
WTO accession in 2001. As plotted in Figure 1, imports from non-OECD countries into
the OECD almost doubled as a proportion of GDP over this period. China in particular
accounts for almost half of the increase in low-wage imports. To match this pattern from
the data, the model experiment we consider is an unanticipated, permanent trade shock
moving from the steady-state growth path from trade policy   to a new liberalized policy
 0, as detailed in the theory section above.
4.1 Calibration
We started by specifying the basic parameters about which we have some prior information.
Following Jones (1995a) and King and Rebelo (1999) we consider the case of log utility with
  = 1 and a labor share in production of ↵ = 23 .
18 steady-state growth path real interest
17It is easy to analyze what would occur under the alternative assumption that intermediate goods firms
could substitute towards production of another intermediate goods firm’s o↵-patent varieties. In this case,
Bertrand competition would dictate that the firm with the lower shadow value would take over a market. In
equilibrium, the only possible outcome is equalization of shadow values through Shocked firms takeover of
varieties previously produced by No Shock firms. Such an assumption would then eliminate heterogeneity
in the behavior of Shocked and No Shock firms, directly contradicting our empirical evidence in Section 2
which suggests that innovation systematically varies with low-cost import competition in the cross-section.
18In our model the price of M goods is equal to 11 ↵ = 3 times cost given ↵ =
2
3 , so the markup on new
varieties is substantial. Importantly, however, the average markup in our calibration is much lower, since all
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rates of approximately 4% require   = (0.98)10. We also estimated the ratio H
⇤
H ⇡ 3
from international schooling data on educational attainment in the OECD and non-OECD
countries in the year 2000. Therefore, we identify the OECD nations in our sample with the
North and non-OECD nations with the South. We fix the parameter ⇢ to the baseline value
of ⇢ = 0.5 based on Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2013). Appendix B contains
more information on the calculation of H/H⇤, and a later section checks robustness to
di↵erent values of most of the parameters above.
Table 2: Long-Run Impact of Liberalization
% Pre-Shock Post-Shock
  9.7 20.7
Imports to GDP 3.9 7.0
Growth Rate 2.00 2.37
Southern Terms of Trade 0.5 0.7
Note: The table above displays pre- and post-shock values of the main quantities within the
model. The values reflect the long run or the steady-state growth path associated with the indicated
value of the trade policy parameter  . All quantities are in annualized percentages except for the
Southern terms of trade which is equivalent to the model relative price q.
We must also choose the final three parameters H,  , and  0 which jointly govern the
model’s long-run steady-state growth rates and imports to output ratios. We compute the
ratio of non-OECD imports to OECD GDP in 1997 (3.9%) and 2006 (7.0%), requiring that
the model reproduce these import ratios in the pre- and post-shock steady-state growth
paths, respectively. In other words, we require that the model reproduce the endpoints of
the non-OECD imports series plotted in Figure 1. These import ratios are heavily influenced
by our choice of   and  0, leaving us still to determine the model’s scale through the choice
of H to match growth rates from the data.
We note that the model’s concept of growth is most closely aligned with frontier per-
capita GDP growth. We therefore prefer to calibrate long-run frontier growth to the per-
capita GDP growth of the United States rather than the entire OECD. We choose a wide
sample window of 1960-2010, yielding a calibration of H to match a pre-shock average
annual growth rate of 2.0%.19
o↵-patent varieties of I and R goods are perfectly competitive. In our pre-trade shock baseline steady-state
growth path calibration described below, the average markup is approximately 40%.
19We take two steps to examine the robustness of our results to this calibration strategy. First, in a robustness
check discussed further in a later section we consider an alternative calibration window ending at Chinese
WTO accession in 2001 for the pre-shock growth rate, and second we also solve a version of the model with
semi-endogenous growth and therefore only level rather than growth e↵ects on output from changes in trade
policy. Details on the semi-endogenous growth version of the model can be found in Appendix D.
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4.2 The Long-Term Impact of a Trade Shock
We summarize the long-term impacts of trade liberalization in our model in Table 2. To
reproduce the changes in the OECD imports to GDP ratio observed in the data requires
an exogenous increase in trade policy   from 9.7% to 20.7%, and this exogenous change
produces, through the e↵ective market size e↵ect discussed in Section 3, a movement in the
long-term growth rate from its pre-shock calibrated value of 2.0% to a new value of 2.37%.
4.3 Transition Dynamics in the Fully Mobile Economy
Next we consider the transition dynamics of the fully mobile economy, starting from the
steady-state growth path associated with trade policy   and allowing an unanticipated and
permanent trade policy shock  !  0 that is announced in period 0 to become e↵ective in
period 1.
In Figure 5, we plot the aggregate transition dynamics of the Fully Mobile economy for
aggregate variety growth, the terms of trade, and output growth in the North and South.
Although it remains unplotted in this figure, consumption growth follows the pattern of
output growth almost identically.
The full transition to the new steady-state growth path is complete in approximately
6 periods (60 years). Given the trade liberalization shock, the Southern terms of trade
increases rapidly to maintain balanced trade, leading to an associated increase in the returns
to innovation and hence the aggregate variety growth rate. Consumption smoothing dictates
a slower, smooth transition of output growth rates to their long-run values.20
We can also compute the long-run welfare gains from trade in the fully mobile envi-
ronment, taking the transition path into account, and we report these in Table 3. The
North gains by a consumption equivalent of 14.2%, while the South gains by a consumption
equivalent of 13.3%. In other words, we would have to increase the consumption of the
Northern household without trade liberalization by 14.2% in every period to make it as well
o↵ is it would be in the equilibrium with the trade liberalization. The details of the welfare
calculations are available in Appendix C.21
These welfare gains from trade are large compared to current state-of-the-art quanti-
tative analysis of the welfare gains from trade relative to autarky in static trade models.
A recent example of this static type of analysis, done in Melitz and Redding (2015) and
relying primarily upon love of variety gains from liberalization, suggests that welfare gains
20The slight overshooting of variety growth in period 1 is due to the fact that Northern interest rates are
initially lower than their new long-run levels, decreasing the marginal cost of innovation and raising the
return to innovation for Northern firms in the short run.
21Note that although both economies can utilize new goods and therefore benefit from the increase in long-run
growth rates, the terms of trade ensure that the North uses these new goods with higher intensity and
therefore benefits slightly more from liberalization.
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Figure 5: Liberalization Boosts Growth in the Fully Mobile Model
Note: The figure displays the transition path in response to a permanent, unanticipated
trade liberalization from policy parameter   to  0 >  , which is announced in period 0
to become e↵ective in period 1. The plotted transition is computed in the Fully Mobile
economy, in which intermediate goods firms may respond to the information about trade
liberalization without short-term adjustment costs. The solid black line is the transition
path, the upper horizontal solid blue line is the post-shock steady-state growth path, and
the lower horizontal dashed red line is the pre-shock steady-state growth path.
from all trade for the US around the year 2000 are approximately 2.5%. It is clear that the
higher rate of growth induced by the liberalization could be a powerful source of welfare
improvement from trade.
4.4 Transition Dynamics in the Trapped Factors Economy
In Figure 6 we plot the path of some selected aggregates over a Trapped Factors transition
path. Comparing the Trapped Factors transition with the Fully Mobile transition in Figure
5, we immediately note that the variety growth rate is higher upon impact of the trade
shock. Instead of a growth rate of about 2.4% in the shock period as seen in the fully
mobile transition, the trapped factors variety growth rate on impact is 2.7%. The increased
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Northern innovation and flow of M goods from North to South in the shock period slows
the appreciation in the Southern terms of trade, and output growth in the North and South
both overshoot their long-run levels after the trade shock. Although the transition path
is again complete in approximately 6 periods (60 years), the path of innovation is clearly
significantly higher in the presence of short-run adjustment costs or trapped factors.
Table 3: Trade Shocks, Short-Term Growth, and Welfare Gains
% Short-Term Growth, t = 1 Welfare Gains, Full Transition
Fully Mobile 2.4 14.2
Trapped Factors 2.7 16.3
No China 2.4 7.2
Note: The first column of the table above presents the variety growth rate in the first period
of a trade shock, t = 1, and the second column presents the consumption-equivalent welfare gain of
the Northern consumer from trade liberalization, taking the full transition path into account. Each
row represents one of three alternative economies. The first two are the Fully Mobile and Trapped
Factors economies, with liberalization experiments and long-run e↵ects of trade shocks identical to
those laid out in Table 2. The final economy is a counterfactual No China environment. The No
China experiment is described in Section 4.5, representing partial liberalization under the Trapped
Factors assumption but omitting the e↵ects of increased Chinese imports into the OECD over the
sample period.
Recall that we assume that there are two industries with half of the firms each. One of
these industries (Shocked) contains all the shocked firms and bears the brunt of the direct
e↵ects of liberalization. The other industry, No Shock, has no liberalized R goods. In
Figure 7, we plot three separate patent flows. In the solid black bar on the left labeled
Pre-Shock, we present period 0 or pre-shock patent flows for the Shocked and No Shock
industries, which are ex-ante identical. These patent flows are arbitrarily normalized to
1, 000 for ease of reference. The blue middle bar with downward-sloping lines and the red
right bar with upward-sloping lines, by contrast, plot the patent flows for industry No Shock
and for industry Shocked during period 1, the period in which policy liberalization becomes
e↵ective. Although both industries increase patenting during the shock period due to terms
of trade movements, the Shocked industry patents approximately 28.8% more in the period
after the shock.
The di↵erential impact in Figure 7 of trade shocks on innovation across exposure levels
is entirely absent in the Fully Mobile economy. In that environment, by contrast, Shocked
and No Shock firms engage in identical levels of patenting in period 1, since fully flexible
innovation choices are entirely forward-looking. Our model therefore implies that the pres-
ence of trapped factors or input adjustment costs leads to higher sensitivity of patent growth
to trade liberalization in the cross-section. This implied link is entirely consistent with our
disaggregated empirical results from Table 1 documenting a larger increase in innovation in
23
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Figure 6: Trapped Factors Increase Short-Run Growth
Note: The figure displays the Trapped Factors transition path in response to a permanent,
unanticipated trade liberalization from policy parameter   to  0 >  , which is announced
in period 0 to become e↵ective in period 1. Since the plotted transition is computed in
the Trapped Factors economy, adjustment costs prevent the movement of resources outside
of intermediate goods firms within the period of the shock. The solid black line is the
transition path, the upper horizontal solid blue line is the post-shock steady-state growth
path, and the lower horizontal dashed red line is the pre-shock steady-state growth path.
those industries and firms with higher measured levels of trapped factors.
The stark increase in innovation or patenting at firms in the shocked industry is directly
linked to a surplus of resources useful for R&D at those firms, which unexpectedly lose
24% of their R goods varieties to import competition. In Figure 8 we expand the set of
variables included in the Trapped Factors transition path. In the top two panels we can
see the shadow value of resources in each industry, which in times without trade shocks
is normalized to 100%. Since the lost R goods opportunities imply a surplus of inputs
which must be allocated to the unanticipated use of innovation, on the top left panel we
see an opportunity cost or resource shadow value decline of 25.5% in period 1 for firms
in the Shocked industry. As noted above, these declines in the shadow value of inputs
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Figure 7: A Shocked Industry Patents More
Note: The solid black bar on the left displays the level of industry patenting in the period
before a permanent and unanticipated trade liberalization from policy parameter   to  0 >
 . Patent flows in the pre-shock period are normalized to equal 1000. The middle blue
bar with downward-sloping lines and right red bar with upward-sloping lines represent the
response of the No Shock and Shocked industries, respectively, to the trade liberalization
in an economy with trapped factors. The Shocked industry loses 24.2% of its previously
protected R goods production opportunities when these are converted to imported I goods
from the South, and the No Shock industry does not lose any unanticipated R goods to
Southern competition.
are moderate compared to existing empirical estimates of adjustment costs within firms,
lending quantitative plausibility to our underlying trapped factors assumption.
In the upper right panel of Figure 8 we also see a much more moderate decline in
opportunity costs by around 9.8% at firms in the No Shock industry. This is less intuitive
and operates entirely through general equilibrium channels. To understand this, we must
examine the movements in interest rates also recorded in Figure 8. The sudden increase
in variety growth in the Northern economy in the shock period induces an increase in
consumption growth rates and hence interest rates. Therefore, even though this does not
represent an increases in resources within the No Shock firms, the higher interest rates and
hence changed marginal valuations of their Northern owners require a fall in these firms’
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Figure 8: Trapped Factors Interest Rates and Shadow Values
Note: The figure displays the Trapped Factors transition path in response to a permanent,
unanticipated trade liberalization from policy parameter   to  0 >  , which is announced
in period 0 to become e↵ective in period 1. Since the plotted transition is computed in
the Trapped Factors economy, adjustment costs prevent the movement of resources outside
of intermediate goods firms within the period of the shock. The solid black line is the
transition path, the upper horizontal solid blue line is the post-shock steady-state growth
path, and the lower horizontal dashed red line is the pre-shock steady-state growth path.
For the two shadow value figures, shadow values are normalized to equal 100% in non-shock
periods.
shadow values to deliver consistency with their value-maximization problem.
Turning again to welfare measures, the total consumption equivalent welfare increases
from the trade shock with trapped factors are 16.3% for the North, compared to the 14.2%
dynamic gains in the fully mobile case discussed above. To understand this larger welfare
gain from trapped factors, note that the externalities in the innovation process through
which previous ideas at one firm assist later innovation by all firms are not taken into
account in the firm’s innovation optimality conditions. Hence, there is “too little” R&D
from a social welfare perspective, as is typical in endogenous growth models. The initial
increase in variety growth due to the trapped factors mechanism helps to moderate this
social ine ciency and leads to a welfare increase in our model. Compared to the aggregate
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welfare gains of 14.2% from trade liberalization in the fully mobile case, the marginal impact
of the trapped factors mechanism is approximately a tenth of the total gains from trade
liberalization (2.1%) in the long-term. However, while this is small overall, in the first period
or 10 years of our simulation trapped factors roughly doubles the impact of the trade shock
on innovation. So the short-run impact of this mechanism is quite large and may thus be
important for policy horizons and empirical analysis.
4.5 What is the Contribution of China to OECD Growth?
Our model suggests that there was a market size e↵ect and a trapped factors e↵ect from the
expansion of low-wage country trade from 1997 to 2006. Given the intense policy interest
and recent academic literature in the area,22 we now consider the incremental e↵ect of the
increased trade with China alone. To do this, we scale back the trade shock by assuming
that from 1997 to 2006 exports from other countries grew as they did in reality but that
exports from China remained constant as a fraction of OECD GDP. With the resulting “No
China” counterfactual, maintaining our trapped factors assumption, we can calculate by
how much growth and welfare increase in our baseline because of the e↵ect of China alone.
Over the period 1997 2006, Chinese exports as a share of OECD GDP increased by 1.6
percentage points from 0.79% to 2.4%. So of the 3.1 percentage point increase in non-OECD
import shares, over half was from China. Figure 9 plots the Trapped Factors transition path
in the baseline and No China cases. The growth and terms of trade e↵ects of liberalization
are dampened considerably.
In the North, the consumption-equivalent welfare gain for the North of the baseline
transition path relative to the No China case is approximately 7.2%, and approximately
6.8% in the South. Compared to the baseline gains from trade liberalization considered
above of 16.3%, this implies that the Chinese contribution to the gains from liberalization
are approximately 44%. The long-run growth e↵ects of China are similarly substantial, with
post-liberalization steady-state growth rates in the No China case of 2.2% rather than the
baseline 2.4%, a contribution of approximately 0.2%. We conclude that understanding the
OECD and Chinese policies which contributed to the increased trade with China is crucial
when quantifying dynamic gains from liberalization over this period.
A caveat to this strategy is that it assumes a counterfactual world in which policy-
makers do not make up the gap by relaxing restrictions on non-Chinese low-wage imports.
If such a relaxation did take place this would reduce the marginal contribution of China to
welfare. In a robustness check in Appendix B, we compute the marginal impact of China
with half of all Chinese import growth allowed in as imports from the non-OECD non-
22For example, Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013), Manova and Zhang (2012), Khandelwal, et al. (2011), and
Pierce and Schott (2012).
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Figure 9: Trade Liberalization without Chinese Import Growth
Note: The figure displays the transition path in response to trade liberalization in two
scenarios. The first transition path, in solid black, “Baseline,” replicates the Trapped
Factors transition path displayed in Figure 6 above. A permanent and unanticipated trade
liberalization from   to  0 >   is announced in period 0 to become e↵ective in period 1.
The second transition path in green with triangle symbols, “No China,” plots the Trapped
Factors transition path, starting with the same initial conditions as “Baseline,” but instead
considering a counterfactual increase of   to a level between   and  0 which matches post-
liberalization imports to GDP ratios assuming no growth in Chinese imports into the OECD.
The upper horizontal solid blue line is the post-shock steady-state growth path, and the
lower horizontal dashed red line is the pre-shock steady-state growth path.
Chinese countries. As expected, these results essentially halve the Chinese contribution to
innovation and welfare.
5 Extensions and Robustness
In this section we discuss some extensions and the robustness of our results to various
alternative assumptions and calibrations.
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Figure 10: Trapped Factors Transition Dynamics are Robust
Note: The figure displays the Trapped Factors transition path in response to a permanent,
unanticipated trade liberalization from policy parameter   to  0 >  , which is announced
in period 0 to become e↵ective in period 1. All plotted parameterizations of the model vary
only the parameter indicated in the legend, starting from the Trapped Factors calibration
described in the text.
5.1 Robustness of Calibration
The qualitative e↵ect of trade liberalization on growth, and the boost of innovation from the
trapped factors mechanism, are quite robust to alternative parameterizations. To demon-
strate this we vary parameter values and consider the impact upon the variety growth rate
in the Trapped Factors transition in Figure 10. In none of these cases is the pattern or
magnitude qualitatively changed. Finally, in an unreported robustness check, we used an
alternative calibration window of the pre-shock growth rate to the US per capita real GDP
growth rate from 1960-2001, with qualitatively similar dynamics starting from a di↵erent
growth level.
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5.2 Semi-endogenous Growth
As discussed above, Jones (1995b) argues for an alternative innovation production function.
We have been using Mft+1 = (Zft)
⇢A1 ⇢t , but an alternative is to use an exponent less
than 1   ⇢ on A1 ⇢t following Jones’ semi-endogenous approach. In such models, steady-
state growth no longer depends on the level of human capital but instead on the growth
of human capital. In Appendix D, we fully re-derive all the implications for long-term
growth from such a model and numerically compute transition paths in this case, allowing
for growth in human capital. Reasonably calibrated transition dynamics are extremely
persistent, and long-run di↵erences between our baseline model and the semi-endogenous
growth model are heavily discounted into the future. The two model assumptions therefore
deliver remarkably similar quantitative welfare results.
5.3 R&D Congestion E↵ects
Another concern with our baseline model is that R&D could have cross-firm congestion
e↵ects from research duplication or patent races. In an extension discussed in detail in
Appendix E, we also introduce a model parameter ⌘ which allows for R&D congestion
externalities. ⌘ flexibly nests our baseline case of no congestion externalities, (⌘ = 1), but
also allows for intermediate degrees of congestion all the way to the extreme case of full
externalization of R&D costs (⌘ = 0).
Empirical evidence suggests that these congestion e↵ects are not large in the economy
as a whole. Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2013) estimate congestion e↵ects from
a large sample of US firms and find them to be statistically insignificant (i.e. ⌘ = 1).23
Consequently, we have chosen to omit R&D cost externalities from the baseline model. For
completeness, however, we also consider the intermediate case of ⌘ = 0.5 in Figure 10. In
this case, congestion externalities dampen the magnitude of the short-term growth boost
from trade. The dampening e↵ect is not quantitatively large, however, and the long-run
growth e↵ect remains the same.
5.4 Southern Innovation
Our construction of the baseline model above assumes that no innovation occurs in the
Southern economy. In Appendix F we extend the model to incorporate innovation of new
varieties by Southern intermediate goods firms. To match low non-OECD patenting rates
in the data, we allow for and calibrate lower relative productivity in innovation in the
23Table IV of Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen (2013) is suggestive that R&D undertaken by firms’
product rivals has no negative congestion e↵ects on rates of innovation, and R&D done by firms’ technology
markets rivals generates the usual large positive knowledge spillovers.
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South. As discussed in more detail in Appendix F, the presence of Southern innovation
implies that import ratios in the North are less sensitive to trade liberalization, requiring
a larger liberalization shock to match the observed increase in low-cost import penetration
in the North. Although the dynamic patterns are very similar, the larger required shock
with Southern innovation implies that the baseline results above conservatively report the
potential long-term dynamic benefits from trade liberalization. In particular, growth rates
in the economy with Southern innovation increase from 2.0% to 2.7% in the long-term, which
can be compared to the increase from 2.0% to 2.4% observed in the baseline environment
without Southern innovation.
5.5 Other E↵ects of China on Welfare
Trade between OECD countries and low-wage countries like China can have a large number
of e↵ects in addition to the ones we consider. We focus on its impact on the incentives for
developing new goods because of the sheer potential scale of the dynamic gains from trade.
The most important potential o↵set to these gains, however, might come from the labor
market. Our model, like many others in trade, abstracts away from the unemployment and
wage losses that may arise as workers are reallocated. Recent work by Pierce and Schott
(2012), Autor and Dorn (2013) and Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) suggests that these
dislocation e↵ects can be substantial. There may be long-run e↵ects on inequality through
Heckscher-Ohlin factor price equalization e↵ects or imperfect labor markets. Helpman,
Itskhoki and Redding (2010) show how trade may increase steady state unemployment
and wage inequality by making the exporting sector more attractive in a search theoretic
context, with some evidence for the theory in Helpman, Itskhoki, Muendler, and Redding
(2012).
When our adjustment costs trap factors of production inside a firm, an unexpected in-
crease in low-wage imports will cause losses that must be shared between the workers and
the equity holders of an a↵ected firm. We do not model how these losses are shared, so that
in e↵ect our approach is equivalent to making the assumption that there is a perfect insur-
ance market among all residents in the North. To be sure, other types of adjustment costs
could reduce welfare by making unemployment worse or exposing people to new uninsured
risks. But as our analysis shows, in endogenous models of growth, it does not immediately
follow that adjustment costs necessarily reduce the gains from trade.
5.6 Anticipation E↵ects
We have modeled the trade shock as being unexpected to firms. Although events such as
China’s WTO accession were of course partially anticipated, there was some surprise as
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negotiations were fraught. Moreover, in the entire European Union the liberalizations with
China were temporarily reversed due to a political backlash.
To the extent that a shift from   to  0 is announced in anticipated, agents will change
their behavior.24 In particular there will be a disincentive to invest in trapped factors
because the firm anticipates the liberalization. Hence, Northern firms will start shifting into
innovative activities prior to the liberalization. The transition dynamics will change even
though the long-run post-transition growth rates will remain the same. These considerations
also demonstrate why a policy maker cannot engineer a larger short-run e↵ect from trade by
increasing adjustment costs. Increasing firing costs, for example, will certainly make factors
more trapped, but it would itself signal impending liberalization and undue the desired
innovative e↵ect.
5.7 Patent Length vs. Adjustment Cost Horizon
Embedded within our analysis is an assumption that the model period, 10 years in our
calibration, represents both the monopoly protection period and the period over which
factors are trapped. While this is not an unreasonable assumption given large empirical
estimates of adjustment costs,25 it is clearly very stark and worth exploring.
Allowing asset and monopoly lengths to di↵er would considerably complicate our analy-
sis. However, we can consider the impacts qualitatively by examining the two potential cases
arising from delinking the monopoly horizon (TM ) years, from the adjustment cost horizon
(TA). First, if TA > TM , then adjustment-cost induced periods of immobility are longer
than monopoly protection. Trapped inputs would be used for the innovation of multiple
cohorts of new varieties, which would likely not change the results qualitatively.
In the alternative case of TA < TM , pre-innovated cohorts of on-patent varieties may
exist within firms at the time of a trade shock. These pre-existing monopoly varieties
would o↵er an alternative substitution possibility into which trapped resources could be
directed instead of innovation. This would reduce the innovation boost induced by our
trapped factors mechanism, but on the other hand it would also reduce the welfare loss
from monopoly markups. Hence, the net impact on welfare is ambiguous.
24See Costantini and Melitz (2008) for similar points in the context of technology adoption and trade.
25Capital and labor adjustment costs are typically estimated at between 10% to 50% of the lifetime cost
of the assets (Bloom 2009) making these long–term investment similar to intellectual property protection.
Also, while patent lengths vary between 15 to 20 years, e↵ective patent lengths are typically shorter due
to imitation, processing lags, and imperfections in enforcement. As such, a 10 year patent life seems quite
reasonable in our theoretical structure.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we present a new general equilibrium model of trade with endogenous growth
that allows factors of production to be temporarily trapped in firms due, for example, to
input specificity. This trapped factors model allows us to rationalize why in the face of an
import shock from a low-wage country like China, incumbent firms in the a↵ected industry
may innovate more, as the firm-level micro-data suggests. Trapped factors in the model
can also explain additional cross-sectional patterns which we document, suggesting that the
increase in innovation in the face of Chinese competition is stronger for firms with higher
levels of input specificity.
The force behind this pattern in our model is a fall in the opportunity cost of R&D
caused by a fall in the shadow cost of these trapped factors. The model also contains the
more standard theoretical mechanism from the literature on trade and growth, whereby
integration increases the profits from innovation.
We calibrate the model and quantify the e↵ects of a trade liberalization of the magnitude
we observed in the decade around China’s accession to the WTO, 1997-2006. We find
a substantial increase in welfare from such trade integration: a consumption equivalent
increase of the order of 16% and a permanent increase in growth of around 0.4%. This
leads to welfare e↵ects that are much larger than conventional calibrations of static trade
models which ignore the dynamic e↵ects of trade on growth. A moderate fraction of the
overall welfare gains from trade in the long-term, 2% out of a total 16%, are due to our
trapped factors mechanism. However, the short-term impact of trapped factors is large,
contributing an additional 0.3% to growth in the immediate aftermath of liberalization.
Such short-term impacts are likely important at a policymaking horizon.
Note that the dynamic gains from trade in terms of growth or welfare depend entirely
upon increased profits that innovators in the North can earn from sales in the South. In
this sense, the model ratifies the increasing attention that trade negotiators are devoting
to non-tari↵ barriers that might limit a foreign firm’s ability to earn profits from a newly
developed good. We have seen this already in the TRIPS agreement under the WTO, and
better protection of intellectual property rights is also reported to be a central goal in the
US approach to the negotiations leading up to the Trans Pacific Partnership. If this is where
the largest welfare gains lie, this is where trade agreements can have their biggest e↵ects.
As noted in the introduction, there are many ways in which the modeling framework
could be extended and made more realistic. We briefly touch on some additional potential
avenues for exploration here. First, we have abstracted from “catch-up” in which growth
rates in the South are higher than in North due to imitation or input accumulation. We
did this in order to focus on welfare benefits in the North from loosened trade restrictions
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alone. Second, we focus on the impact of North-South integration rather than North-North
integration. This was motivated by evidence that the pro-innovation e↵ects in the North
were far stronger when trade barriers against the South were relaxed compared to richer
countries, but an extended framework along say the lines of Aghion et al. (2005) could
allow for Schumpeterian and “escape competition” e↵ects due to within-OECD liberaliza-
tion. Third, a more careful analysis of the labor market and uninsured risk could o↵er an
important o↵set to the e↵ects that we identify. Although we have gone beyond steady states
to look at transition dynamics we have, as is standard, abstracted away from distributional
changes. Workers may su↵er wage losses and unemployment if we introduce frictions in the
labor market. These do seem to matter empirically, and more work needs to be done in the
future to incorporate such e↵ects in quantitative theory models (e.g. Harrison, McLaren,
and McMillan 2011; Pessoa 2015).
The main message of our paper is that liberalized trade with the South can have sub-
stantial benefits for the North and the entire world because it induces more innovation. This
increase arises mainly through long-run increases in the profits that a firm can earn from
a newly developed good, but also because of a strong contribution from trapped factors in
the short run that reduces the opportunity cost of innovation. China alone accounts for
almost half of the gains we identify.
Because these benefits are less visible than the losses that firms and workers can face from
an unexpected increase in trade, and because some of the long-term e↵ects we document
can take decades to be realized, it is as important as ever for economists to understand why
it may be so important to pursue and protect the gains from trade.
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Online Appendices: Not Intended for Pub-
lication Unless Requested
Appendix A - Theoretical Details and Proofs
In this appendix we give more technical details and proofs of our main results. We begin
with a full statement of the equilibrium concept for the closed economy, as well as a charac-
terization of the closed-economy steady-state growth rate referred to in the main text. We
then state the open economy equilibrium definition, characterize steady-state open economy
growth rates, and define the trapped factors trade shock equilibrium.
Definition 1 Closed-Economy Equilibrium
Given initial conditions A0, xj0 , an equilibrium is a path of wages, interest rates, stock
prices, and intermediate goods prices wt, rt, qft, pjt , together with stock portfolio deci-
sions, debt levels, final goods firm input demands, intermediate goods firms input demands,
intermediate goods firm innovation quantities, intermediate goods dividends, aggregate in-
novation quantities, firm variety portfolios, and aggregate variety quantities sft, bt, HDt ,
xDjt, x
S
jt+1, Mft+1, dft, At, Aft, Mt, such that
Households Optimize: Taking wages wt, interest rates rt, and stock prices qft as given,
the representative household maximizes the present discounted value of its consumption
stream by choosing period consumption Ct, debt bt+1, and share purchases sft, i.e. these
decisions solve
max
Ct,bt+1,sjt
1X
t=0
 tC1  t
1   
bt+1+Ct+
NX
f=1
qft(sft sft 1)  (1 + rt+1)bt+wtH+
NX
f=1
dftsft.
Final Goods Firm Optimizes: Taking wages wt and intermediate goods prices pjt as given,
the competitive representative final goods firm statically optimizes profits by choosing labor
demand HDt and intermediate goods input demands x
D
jt, i.e. these decisions solve
max
Ht,xkt
(Ht)
↵
AtZ
0
(xjt)
1 ↵ dj   wtHt 
AtZ
0
pjtxjtdj.
Intermediate Goods Firms Optimize: Taking marginal utilities mt , perfectly competitive
o↵-patent intermediate goods prices pjt, j  At 1 , and aggregate variety and innovation
levels At, Mt+1 as given, intermediate goods firms maximize firm value, the discounted
stream of dividends, by choosing the measure of newly innovated goods Mft+1 to add to
the existing measure of varieties Aft in their portfolios, the supply of all intermediate goods
for use next period xSjt+1, and the price of on-patent intermediate goods pjt, j 2 (At 1, At],
i.e. these quantities solve
max
pjt,Mft+1,xjt+1
1X
t=0
mtdft
1
dft+
Z
Aft+1
xjt+1dj + Zft
Z
Aft
pjtxjtdj
Zft = ⌫M
 
ft+1A
1  
t , ⌫ =
N  1
 
Labor, Bond, Stock, and Intermediate Goods Markets Clear:
HDt = H, bt+1= 0, sft= 1, x
D
jt+1= x
S
jt+1
Final Goods Market Clears:
Yt= Ct+
At+1Z
0
xjt+1dj+
NX
f=1
Zft
Innovation and Variety Consistency Conditions Hold:
At+1= At+M t+1, Aft+1= Aft+Mft+1, Mt+1=
NX
f=1
Mft+1, At=
NX
f=1
Aft.
Proposition A1: Closed-Economy Steady-State Growth Path
The closed economy has a unique steady-state growth path with a common constant
growth rate g for varieties, output, and consumption, that satisfies the innovation optimality
condition
g  1 = ⌦ 
1
↵ (1 + g) 
 
↵H, ⌦ = ↵(1  ↵) 2 ↵↵ .
Proof of Proposition A1 To complete the proof of Proposition A1, we need to show
that the rates of growth of output, consumption, and varieties are equal on a steady-state
growth path. First, note that the first-order conditions of the intermediate goods firm
monopoly pricing decision immediately yield
pMt+1 =
1 + rt+1
1  ↵ ,
i.e. they imply that the monopoly price in any future period t + 1 is a fixed markup over
firm marginal cost. Marginal cost is given here by the interest rate rt+1 from the current
period t into the next period t + 1. The household Euler equation immediately implies
the interest rate rt+1 =
1
  (
Ct+1
Ct
) . We then immediately obtain the optimal intermediate
goods firm pricing rule pMt+1 =
1
  (
Ct+1
Ct
)  11 ↵ . For later reference, note that the pricing of
o↵-patent varieties, which we will label R goods, is given by pR+1 = 1 + rt+1 =
1
  (
Ct+1
Ct
) 
via perfect competition and the household Euler equation.
Now write the final goods market clearing condition
Ct = H
↵
⇥
Mtx
1 ↵
Mt +Rtx
1 a
Rt
⇤ Mt+1xMt+1  Rt+1xRt+1   NP
f=1
Zft,
where we are using the notation that the measure of o↵-patent varieties is given by Rt
2
and equal to Rt = At 1, and the measure of innovated varieties Mt = gAt 1. Now, recall
the assumption of steady-state growth. If we define the growth rate of consumption by gC ,
and note that the by symmetry the individual firm patenting ratios gf = gn , we can use the
intermediate goods firm pricing rules to rewrite the final goods market clearing condition
as
Ct
At
=
1
1 + g
H
h
(1  ↵) 1 ↵↵
⇣
(1  ↵) 1 ↵↵ + 1
⌘
 
1 ↵
↵ (1 + gC)
   ↵
i
  g(1  ↵) 2↵  1↵ (1 + gC)   ↵H
  (1  ↵) 1↵  1↵ (1 + gC)   ↵H  N⌫
⇣ g
N
⌘ 
.
Since CtAt is constant, we conclude that g = gC , so that the innovation optimality con-
dition, i.e. the first-order condition of an intermediate goods firm with respect to R&D
expenditures, reads
⌫ 
N (  1)
g  1 = ⌦ 
1
↵ (1 + g) 
 
↵H.
This expression motivates the choice of the scaling constant
⌫ =
N (  1)
 
,
so that the steady-state growth path growth rates are invariant to the number of firms or
the degree of cost externalities across firms as well as the number of firms N . We obtain
the steady-state growth path innovation optimality condition
g  1= ⌦ 
1
↵ (1 + g) 
 
↵H.
The left-hand side, the marginal cost of innovation, is strictly increasing in g, is equal to 0
when g = 0, and limits to 1 as g ! 1 . The right-hand side, the discounted monopoly
profits from innovation, is strictly decreasing in g, is equal to ⌦ 
1
aH > 0 when g = 0, and
limits to 0 as g !1 . We conclude that a steady-state growth path equilibrium exists and
is uniquely determined by the value of g which satisfies the innovation optimality condition.
This completes the proof.
Definition 2 Open-Economy Equilibrium
Given any initial conditions A0, xj0, x⇤j0 , along with a sequence of trade restric-
tions  t , an equilibrium in the open economy is a set of terms of trade, interest rates,
wages, stock prices, and intermediate goods prices qt, rt, r⇤t , wt, w⇤t , qft, q⇤ft, pjt, and p
⇤
jt ,
along with stock portfolio decisions, debt levels, final goods firm input demands, interme-
diate goods firms input demands, intermediate goods firm innovation quantities, interme-
diate goods firm portfolios, intermediate goods dividends, aggregate innovation quantities,
imported variety measures, restricted variety measures, and aggregate variety quantities
sft, s⇤ft, bt+1, b
⇤
t+1, H
D
t , H
⇤D
t , x
D
jt, x
⇤D
jt , x
S
jt+1, x
⇤S
jt+1, Mft+1, Ajt, A
⇤
ft,dft, d
⇤
ft, Mt,It, Rt, and
At such that
Northern Household Optimizes: Taking wages wt, interest rates rt, and stock prices
qft as given, the representative household in the North maximizes the present discounted
value of its consumption stream by choosing period consumption Ct, debt bt+1, and share
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purchases sft, i.e. these decisions solve
max
Ct,bt+1,sjt
1X
t=0
 tC1  t
1   
bt+1 +Ct +
NX
f=1
qft (sft  sft 1 )  (1 + rt+1 )bt +wt H+
NX
f=1
dft sft .
Southern Household Optimizes: Taking wages w⇤t , interest rates r⇤t , and stock prices q⇤ft as
given, the representative household in the South maximizes the present discounted value of
its consumption stream by choosing period consumption C⇤t , debt b⇤t+1, and share purchases
s⇤ft, i.e. these decisions solve
max
C⇤t ,b⇤t+1,s⇤ft
1X
t=0
 t (C⇤t )
1  
1   
b⇤t+1+C
⇤
t+
NX
f=1
q⇤ft(s
⇤
ft s⇤ft 1)  (1 + r⇤t+1)b⇤t+w⇤tH⇤+
NX
f=1
d⇤fts
⇤
ft.
Northern Final Goods Firm Optimizes: Taking wages wt and intermediate goods prices pjt
as given, the competitive representative final goods firm in the North statically optimizes
profits by choosing labor demand HDt and intermediate goods input demands x
D
jt, i.e. these
decisions solve
max
Ht,xjt
(Ht)
↵
AtZ
0
(xjt)
1 ↵ dj   wtHt 
AtZ
0
pjtxjtdj.
Southern Final Goods Firm Optimizes: Taking wages w⇤t and intermediate goods prices p⇤jt
as given, the competitive representative final goods firm in the South statically optimizes
profits by choosing labor demand H⇤Dt and intermediate goods input demands xD⇤jt , i.e.
these decisions solve
max
H⇤t ,x⇤jt
(H⇤t )
↵
AtZ
0
 
x⇤jt
 1 ↵
dj   w⇤t H⇤t  
AtZ
0
p⇤jt x
⇤
jtdj .
Northern Intermediate Goods Firm Optimizes: Taking marginal utilities mt , perfectly
competitive o↵-patent intermediate goods prices pjt, j  At 1 , and aggregate variety, trade,
and innovation levels At, Rt , and Mt+1 as given, intermediate goods firms f in the
North maximize firm value, the discounted stream of dividends, by choosing the measure
of newly innovated goods Mft+1 to add to the existing measure of varieties Aft in their
portfolios, the supply of all intermediate goods in their portfolio for use next period xSjt+1,
x⇤Sjt+1, and the price of on-patent intermediate goods pjt, j 2 (At 1, At], i.e. these quantities
solve
max
pjt,Mft+1,xjt+1,x⇤jt+1
1X
t=0
mt dft
4
dft +
Z
Aft+1
(xjt+1 +x
⇤
jt+1 )dj + Zft
Z
Aft
pjt (xjt +x
⇤
jt )dj
Zft= ⌫M
 
ft+1A
1  
t .
Southern Intermediate Goods Firm Optimizes: Taking marginal utilities m⇤t and perfectly
competitive o↵-patent intermediate goods prices p⇤jt, j  At 1 as given, intermediate goods
firms f in the South maximize firm value, the discounted stream of dividends, by choosing
the supply of all intermediate goods in their portfolios A⇤ft for use next period x
S
jt+1, x
⇤S
jt+1,
i.e. these quantities solve
max
Mft+1,xjt+1,x⇤jt+1
1X
t=0
m⇤t dft
d⇤ft+
Z
A⇤ft+1
(xjt+1+x
⇤
jt+1)dj 
Z
A⇤ft
p⇤jt(xjt+x
⇤
jt)dj.
Labor, Bond, Stock, and Intermediate Goods Markets Clear
HDt = H, H
⇤D
t = H
⇤,
bt+1 = 0, b
⇤
t+1 = 0,
sft = 1, s
⇤
ft = 1,
xDjt = x
S
jt, x
⇤D
jt = x
⇤S
jt .
Final Goods Markets Clear
Yt = H
↵
Z
x1 ↵jt dj = Ct +Rt+1xRt+1 +Mt+1(xMt+1 + x
⇤
Mt+1) +
NX
f=1
Zft
Y ⇤t = (H
⇤)↵
AtZ
0
 
x⇤jt
 1 ↵
dj = C⇤t +Rt+1x
⇤
Rt+1 + It+1(xIt+1 + x
⇤
It+1)
No Arbitrage Pricing Condition Holds
pjt = qtp
⇤
jt
Trade is Balanced
ItpItxIt =MtpMtx
⇤
Mt
Innovation and Variety Consistency Conditions Hold:
 t (Rt +It ) = It , It +Rt = At 1 , It +Rt +M t = At ,
Aft+1= Aft+Mft+1, Mt=
NX
f=1
Mft, Mt+Rt=
NX
f=1
Aft, It+Rt=
NX
f=1
A⇤ft.
Southern Cost Advantage Condition Holds: O↵-restriction goods are always produced in
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the Southern economy only.
Although the Fully Mobile economy with a trade shock has essentially the same equi-
librium concept as laid out in the previous section initially discussing the open economy,
we must be more explicit about the Trapped Factors environment. In the Trapped Factors
equilibrium, Northern intermediate goods firms face an additional constraint due to the
adjustment costs preventing them from immediately responding in their input usage to the
new trade shock. Formally, they must solve the modified problem
max
pft,Mft+1,xjt+1,x⇤jt+1,Xft
1X
t=0
mtdft
dft +
Z
Aft+1
(xjt+1 + x
⇤
jt+1)dj + Zft 
Z
Aft
pjt(xjt + x
⇤
jt)dj
Z
Aft+1
(xjt+1 + x
⇤
jt+1)dj + Zft   Xft
 
 Et,t+1
 
,
where Xft
 
 Et,t+1
 
is the optimal input demand for period t , given expectations of the
trade restriction  Et,t+1 for the next period. Xft is also indexed by f and depends both
upon the number of M goods that the firm plans to produce for next period, as well as
the number of R goods that the firm has in its portfolio and plans to produce for the next
period. Therefore, although these portfolio shares are only allocative in a period in which
a trade shock occurs, we must be explicit about the structure we assume for the pre-shock
portfolios of R goods held by each firm f , as well as the actual allocation of the trade shock
liberalization among existing firms’ measures of R goods. We now define some additional
notation. Let esf be the share of o↵-patent R goods production firm f anticipates doing
before the trade shock, where
NX
f=1
esf = 1 . Then, let the trade shock allocate destruction of
R goods production opportunities across firms so that only the proportion  f of R goods
varieties can still be produced in each firm. As long as we have the consistency condition
NX
f=1
esf f (1   )At= (1   0)At,
an arbitrary choice of  f will be consistent with the trade shock   !  0. We will
henceforth make the assumption that esf = 1N for all firms, i.e. that pre-shock allocations
of R goods production is uniform across firms. This assumption grows naturally out of our
structure in which we assume that firms continue to be the producers of goods which they
invented, even after these goods fall o↵-patent and become perfectly competitive. We
also will now assume that N is even, and that half of the firms in the economy are in the
“No Shock” industry, industry 1 . The other half of firms in the economy, those in the
“Shocked” industry 2 , experience a loss of R goods production opportunities during the
trade shock with only a fixed proportion  2 of R goods remaining. This framework
is a rough approximation of the heterogeneity in the direct e↵ects on firms in developed
countries during the trade liberalizations of the early 2000s. Seen in this light, industries
6
such as textiles which experienced a substantial loss of protection against manufacturers in
low-wage economies such as China, can be identified with industry 2 , while other industries
would be represented by firms in group 1 in our environment. We now define a trapped
factors equilibrium formally.
Definition 3 Trapped Factors Trade Shock Equilibrium
Given any initial conditions A0, xj0, x⇤j0 and a sequence of trade restrictions
 s=
⇢
 , s  t,
 0, s > t ,
where the trade shift from   to  0 >   is unanticipated and a↵ects only Shocked in-
dustry 2, leaving the proportion  2 of R goods in industry 2 restricted, a Trapped
Factors equilibrium in the open economy is a set of terms of trade, interest rates, wages,
stock prices, and intermediate goods prices qt, rt, r⇤t , wt, w⇤t , qft, q⇤ft, pjt, and p
⇤
jt, along
with stock portfolio decisions, debt levels, final goods firm input demands, intermedi-
ate goods firms input demands, intermediate goods firm innovation quantities, interme-
diate goods firm portfolios, intermediate goods dividends, aggregate innovation quantities,
imported variety measures, restricted variety measures, and aggregate variety quantities
sft, s⇤ft, bt+1, b
⇤
t+1, H
D
t , H
⇤D
t , x
D
jt, x
⇤D
jt ,x
S
jt+1,x
⇤S
jt+1, Mft+1, Aft,A
⇤
ft,dft, d
⇤
ft,Mt,It, Rt, and At
such that the following hold.
Northern Household Optimizes: Taking wages wt, interest rates rt, and stock prices
qft as given, the representative household in the North maximizes the present discounted
value of its consumption stream by choosing period consumption Ct, debt bt+1, and share
purchases sft, i.e. these decisions solve
max
Ct,bt+1,sft
1X
t=0
 tC1  t
1   
bt+1 + Ct +
NX
f=1
qft(sft   sft 1)  (1 + rt+1)bt + wtH +
NX
f=1
dftsft.
Southern Household Optimizes: Taking wages w⇤t , interest rates r⇤t , and stock prices q⇤ft as
given, the representative household in the South maximizes the present discounted value of
its consumption stream by choosing period consumption C⇤t , debt b⇤t+1, and share purchases
s⇤ft, i.e. these decisions solve
max
C⇤t ,b⇤t+1,s⇤ft
1X
t=0
 t (C⇤t )
1  
1   
b⇤t+1 + C
⇤
t +
NX
f=1
q⇤ft(s
⇤
ft   s⇤ft 1)  (1 + r⇤t+1)b⇤t + w⇤tH⇤ +
NX
f=1
d⇤fts
⇤
ft.
Northern Final Goods Firm Optimizes: Taking wages wt and intermediate goods prices pjt
as given, the competitive representative final goods firm in the North statically optimizes
profits by choosing labor demand HDt and intermediate goods input demands x
D
jt, i.e.
7
these decisions solve
max
Ht,xjt
(Ht)
↵
AtZ
0
(xjt)
1 ↵ dj   wtHt  
AtZ
0
pjtxjtdj.
Southern Final Goods Firm Optimizes: Taking wages w⇤t and intermediate goods prices p⇤jt
as given, the competitive representative final goods firm in the South statically optimizes
profits by choosing labor demand H⇤Dt and intermediate goods input demands xD⇤jt , i.e.
these decisions solve
max
H⇤t ,x⇤jt
(H⇤t )
↵
AtZ
0
 
x⇤jt
 1 ↵
dj   w⇤tH⇤t  
AtZ
0
p⇤jtx
⇤
jtdj.
Northern Intermediate Goods Firm Optimizes: Taking marginal utilities mt, perfectly
competitive o↵-patent intermediate goods prices pjt, j  At 1, and aggregate variety, trade,
and innovation levels At, Rt,Mt+1 as given intermediate goods firms in the North maximize
firm value, the discounted stream of dividends, by first choosing the quantity of inputs
Xft
 
 Et,t+1
 
given their expectations of trade policy next period, then choosing the measure
of newly innovated goods Mft+1 to add to the existing measure of varieties Aft in their
portfolios, the supply of all intermediate goods in their portfolio for use next period xSjt+1,
x⇤Sjt+1, and the price of on-patent intermediate goods pjt, j 2 (At 1, At], i.e. these quantities
solve
max
pjt,Mft+1,xjt+1,x⇤jt+1,Xft
1X
t=0
mtdft
dft +
Z
Aft+1
(xjt+1 + x
⇤
jt+1)dj + Zft 
Z
Aft
pjt(xjt + x
⇤
jt)dj
Z
Aft+1
(xjt+1 + x
⇤
jt+1)dj + Zft   Xft
 
 Et,t+1
 
Zft= ⌫M
 
ft+1A
1  
t
where we have that
 Es,s+1=
⇢
 , s  t
 0, s > t .
Southern Intermediate Goods Firm Optimizes: Taking marginal utilities m⇤t and perfectly
competitive o↵-patent intermediate goods prices p⇤jt, j  At 1 as given, intermediate goods
firms in the South maximize firm value, the discounted stream of dividends, by choosing
the supply of all intermediate goods in their portfolios A⇤ft for use next period x
S
jt+1, x
⇤S
jt+1,
i.e. these quantities solve
max
Mft+1,xjt+1,x⇤jt+1
1X
t=0
m⇤tdft
8
d⇤ft +
Z
Aft+1
(xjt+1 + x
⇤
jt+1)dj 
Z
Aft
p⇤jt(xjt + x
⇤
jt)dj.
Labor, Bond, Stock, and Intermediate Goods Markets Clear
HDt = H, H
⇤D
t = H
⇤,
bt+1 = 0, b
⇤
t+1 = 0,
sft = 1, s
⇤
ft = 1,
xDjt = x
S
jt, x
⇤D
jt = x
⇤S
jt .
Final Goods Markets Clear:
Yt = H
↵
Z
x1 ↵jt dj = Ct +
Z
Rt+1
xjt+1dj +
Z
Mt+1
(xjt+1 + x
⇤
jt+1)dj +
NX
f=1
Zft
Y ⇤t = (H
⇤)↵
AtZ
0
 
x⇤jt
 1 ↵
dj = C⇤t +
Z
Rt+1
x⇤jt+1dj +
Z
It+1
(xjt+1 + x
⇤
jt+1)dj
No Arbitrage Pricing Condition Holds
pjt = qtp
⇤
jt
Trade is Balanced
ItpItxIt =MtpMtx
⇤
Mt
Innovation and Variety Consistency Conditions Hold:
 t(Rt+It) = It, It+Rt= At 1, It+Rt+M t= At,
Aft+1= Aft+Mft+1, Mt=
NX
f=1
Mft, Mt+Rt=
NX
f=1
Aft, It+Rt=
NX
f=1
A⇤ft.
Southern Cost Advantage Condition Holds: O↵-restriction goods are always produced in
the Southern economy only.
Proof of Proposition 2: Open Economy Steady-State Growth Path The de-
mand schedules for intermediate goods, based on the Northern and Southern final goods
firms’ technologies, are given by
xjt = (1  ↵) 1↵Hp 
1
↵
jt
x⇤jt = (1  ↵)
1
↵H⇤
 
p⇤jt
   1↵ ,
where pjt and p⇤jt are the prices of intermediate good variety j in Northern and Southern
output units, respectively, and pjt = qtp⇤jt. The optimality conditions for the Northern
intermediate goods firm, combined with the Euler equations of the Northern representative
9
household for debt and equity, are given by
pRt+1 = 1 + rt+1
pMt+1 =
1 + rt+1
1  ↵
@
@Mft+1
Zft+1 =
✓
1
1 + rt+1
pMt+1   1
◆
(xMt+1 + x
⇤
Mt+1).
Di↵erentiating the cost function and substituting in the optimal pricing rules we have that
the third condition, the innovation optimality condition, is given by
⌫ (gft+1)
(  1)= ⌦ 
1
a (
Ct+1
Ct
) 
 
↵ (H + q
1
↵
t+1H
⇤).
Now the balanced trade condition can be written
MtpMtx
⇤
Mt = ItpItxIt
gtAt 1
(1 + rt)
1  ↵ (1  ↵)
1
↵H⇤
✓
(1 + rt)
qt(1  ↵)
◆  1↵
=  At 1qt(1 + r⇤t )(1  ↵)
1
↵ (qt(1  ↵)) 
1
↵ H
qt =
✓
 H
gtH⇤
◆ ↵
2 ↵
 
✓
1 + rt
1 + r⇤t
◆ 1 ↵
2 ↵
,
where  = (1   ↵)↵ 12 ↵ . Applying the assumption of steady-state growth, we immediately
obtain from the Euler equations of both representative households that interest rates in
the Northern and Southern economies, as well as the terms of trade, are constant. Also,
exactly as in the proof of Proposition A1 , the final goods market clearing conditions for
each economy, together with the assumption of steady-state growth, imply that the ratios
Ct
At
,
C⇤t
At
are constant, so that we conclude that
(1 + r) = (1 + r⇤) =   1(1 + g) , q =
✓
 H
gH⇤
◆ ↵
2 ↵
 .
Now the innovation optimality condition can be rewritten as
g  1= ⌦ 
1
a (1 + g) 
 
↵ (H + q
1
↵H⇤).
Also, substituting the terms of trade formula/balanced trade condition into the innovation
optimality condition yields
g  1= ⌦ 
1
a (1 + g) 
 
↵
 
H +
✓
 H
gH⇤
◆ 1
2 ↵
 
1
↵H⇤
!
.
10
As a function of g, the marginal cost of innovation on the left-hand side is strictly increasing
in g , starting at 0 and growing exponentially to 1 as g ! 1 . The right-hand side,
the discounted monopoly profits from sale of newly patented goods in the North and the
South, is strictly decreasing in g, asymptoting to 1 as g ! 0 and to 0 as g !1 . We
conclude both that there exists a steady-state growth path equilibrium for this economy,
and that it is the unique steady-state growth path growth rate. For any given fixed value
of  , we denote this growth rate, and the associated terms of trade, by g( ) and q( ). This
completes the proof.
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Appendix B - Data and Model Robustness Checks
This Appendix first describes the firm-level data sources and variable construction used in
for the production of Table 1 in Section 2. Then, we describe the aggregate data sources and
construction of the series used to calibrate our model and for various figures throughout
the paper. We conclude by listing the results of robustness checks to alternative model
calibrations and assumptions for the quantitative trade liberalization exercises in Section
4.
Innovation & Trade Data from Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2015)
This subsection describes the data used in Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2015) as well
as in Section 2 of this paper to construct Table 1. First, we broadly describe the data
sources involved. Then we discuss the construction of the industry wage premium proxy for
trapped factors, as well as the calculation of firm-level TFP. Further details on the sample
selection, variable construction, and descriptive statistics can be found in the main text as
well as Appendices A and B of Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2015).
The baseline specifications in Table 1 draw upon the firm-level accounting informa-
tion from both public and private European firms contained in the Bureau Van Dijk
Amadeus database. In columns 1 and 2, data comes from twelve European countries Austria,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland
and the United Kingdom. This is broadly the population of firms who we then match
to the population of patent applications in the European Patent O ce. The measure
ln(PATENTS)ijkt=ln(1+PATijkt), where PATijkt is the number of successful patent appli-
cations filed by firm i in industry j in country k in year t. Then, four-digit industry codes
from the Amadeus database allow for a link to the UN Comtrade database on industry
by country imports and exports. Imports from China in industry j in country k in year
t are equal to the ratio of Chinese imports in the same industry-country-year cell to to-
tal imports in the same industry-country-year cell, i.e. IMPCHjkt =
MChinajkt
MWorldjkt
. For firms that
operate across multiple four digit industries we use a weighted average of Chinese import
shares across these di↵erent industries. Five year di↵erencing yields   ln(PATENTS)ijkt ⌘
ln(PATENTS)ijkt - ln(PATENTS)ijkt 4 and  IMPCHjkt ⌘ IMPCHjkt - IMPCHjkt 4.
In column 2 of Table 1 we augment   ln(PATENTS)ijkt and  IMPCHjkt with data on
industry wage premia. These are computed from auxiliary worker-level Mincerian wage
regressions on data from pooled cross sections in the United Kingdom’s Labor Force Survey
(LFS). The LFS data provides representative cross-sections of worker-level hourly wages in
two quarters, representing the first and last periods of five quarters of data collection for
each worker in a given year’s sample. Altogether, the sample consists of 107,622 observations
drawn from the 1996 to 2007 releases, covering 1996-2008. For three-digit industry j, the
industry specific wage premium  j is defined as the coe cient on an industry dummy from
the OLS regression
lnwlt =  
0xlt +
X
j
 jINDj + ⇠lt,
where wlt are hourly wages for worker l in quarter t, INDj is a dummy for each of
the three-digit industry codes in the LFS sample, and xlt is a vector of controls including
dummies for each of four education levels, a quadratic in age, as well as gender, year, and
regional dummies.
In columns 3 and 4 restrict the analysis to France, Italy, Spain, and Sweden, which are
the only nations for which accounting regulations insist on detailing materials inputs and
hence have wide coverage of this item in BVD Amadeus. We follow the extension of the
Olley-Pakes control function method de Loecker (2011). As described in detail in Appendix
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B of Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2015) we estimate production functions allowing for
imperfect product market competition. These are estimated separately by two digit sector
based on a control function approach.
To understand how we can proxy trapped factors using TFP consider the basic produc-
tion function:
lnY = A+
X
f
↵f lnXf ,
where Y is output, A is “true” TFP, and Xf is factor input f (L is labor, K is capital,
and M is materials in our case) with output elasticities in the vector ↵. Now allow each
factor to be composed of a base input XB and a firm-specific element, XS = ✓
fXB, ✓
f > 0.
The econometrician observes only the base input XB. An example would be labor where the
econometrician observes the number of workers, and possibly their observable characteristics
like schooling and age, but not the fact that some workers have firm-specific human capital
due to training, etc. Conventionally measured TFP, MTFP is:
lnMTFP = lnY  
X
f
↵f lnXfB = lnA+
X
f
↵f ln(1 + ✓f )
So measured TFP will be equal to true TFP (A) plus a positive term (
P
f ↵
f ln (1 + ✓f ))
that is increasing in the importance of trapped factors. If there are no trapped factors
✓f = 0 and measured TFP is equal to true TFP. But for firms who have more trapped
factors, measured TFP will be higher. If A is the same for all firms in an industry, then a
firm’s MTFP relative to the industry average, which is what we use in the empirical work,
is the correct measure of the importance of trapped factors for a firm.26
A drawback of this method is that we only identify within industry variation in trapped
factors. If all firms have exactly the same amount of trapped factors in an industry, because
TFP is measured relative to an industry average if will appear as if there are no trapped
factors. This is an intrinsic problem when we are not prepared to make TFP comparisons
across industries. It is why it is useful to use this method in conjunction with the previous
method that focuses on industry-wide wage premia as an alternative measure of trapped
factors.
Calculating the ratio of H to H⇤ for model calibration
To calculate the ratio of H to H⇤, we follow the human capital accounting approach in Hall
and Jones (1999) and compute the human capital endowment in country c from the Barro
and Lee (2010) data as Hc = eµcScPc , where Sc is the average number of years of schooling
completed in the adult population above age 25, and Pc is the size of the population of
the country c in 2000. We take into account the di↵erences in educational quality and
the returns to schooling across countries by using the Mincerian returns to education of
immigrants in the United States from country c , µc , from Table 4 in Schoellman (2011).
If Mincerian returns for a country c are not available in Schoellman (2011), we take µc =
7% for non-OECD countries and µc = 9% for OECD countries. These are the averages
26Using a Solow residual approach instead of the regression based approach used here for estimating the ↵0s
would also work. Even if one were to use firm-specific shares in costs, factors will not be paid their full
marginal product and so their contribution to output will be underestimated. For example, consider firm-
specific human capital. The firm generally pay some of the cost of the initial training cost of the worker
acquiring firm specific human capital as the worker cannot realize this value if she leaves the firm. In the
Becker model the firm pays all of the firm-specific training costs and does not raise the wage at all after
training is acquired.
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of returns to schooling for the two categories in Schoellman’s sample. We finally define
Hnon OECD = 2.1
P
c/2OECD
Hc , where the ratio 2.1 corrects for the fact that not all non-
OECD countries are represented in the Barro and Lee data. In particular 2.1 is equal to the
ratio of the non-OECD to OECD population ratio in 2000 in the Wolfram Alpha database
(with full global coverage) to the non-OECD to OECD population ratio in 2000 in the Barro
and Lee data. Such a procedure relies on the implicit assumption that the schooling rates
and returns to education in countries not represented in the Barro and Lee data are similar
to those with data present. From the procedure above we obtain H
⇤
H ⇡ 2.96, which we
round to 3.0 in the text discussion.
Calculating the Trade Shares for Figure 1
The real per-capita output growth rate is from the US NIPA tables, computed as the aver-
age annual real GDP per capita growth rate from 1960-2010. Trade data was downloaded
from the OECD-STAN database, and OECD GDP data comes from the Penn World Ta-
bles, Version 7.1. The non-OECD country to OECD imports to OECD output ratios were
computed over the years 1997-2006. The period was chosen to incorporate the accession of
China to the WTO in 2001, and the 10-year window accords with the model calibration of
a period to 10 years. All of the data and simple calculations performed in the calibration
procedure are available on Nicholas Bloom’s website: http://www.stanford.edu/nbloom.
Figure 1 plots the non-OECD imports to OECD GDP ratio over this period, together with
Chinese imports into the OECD.
Computing Patent Ratios for Figure B1
United States Patent and Trademark O ce data on patents granted from 1977-2006, by
application year and nationality of assignee, were downloaded from the NBER website for
the Patent Data Project in early 2013. This website represents an update of the data which
was originally collected and documented in Hall, Ja↵e, and Trajtenberg (2001). Patents
granted to multiple assignees are counted only once, and the nationality of the patent is
determined by the first assignee. OECD status is as of application year. Total foreign,
non-OECD, and Chinese patent ratios are equal to the number of granted patents with a
particular application year, normalized by the total number of granted patents in the same
application year. This normalization incorporates the reduction in grant numbers as the ap-
plication year approaches the end of the sample, the well known application lag/truncation
problem with patent data of this form. Figure B1 plots the proportion of all US patents
granted by application year from any foreign nation, from non-OECD countries, and from
Chinese assignees, for the years 1977-2006.
Trade Policy Substitution away from China
Total observed low-wage import growth into the OECD as a share of GDP from 1997-
2006 is equal to 3.1%. Growth in Chinese import shares was equal to 1.61%, implying
that non-China/non-OECD countries saw their import shares into the OECD increase by
1.49%. The no China counterfactual in the main text assumed that the growth in Chinese
import shares was completely removed from liberalization over this period. If, however,
policy-makers partially substituted towards other non-OECD imports in lieu of Chinese
imports, we would still see import share growth in the counterfactual. To analyze the
quantitative magnitude of this substitution e↵ect, we consider a case where exactly one
half of Chinese import growth is realized in the no China counterfactual, via substitution
towards other non-OECD countries. Starting with a low-wage import share of 3.9%, this
“half substitution” case exhibits import share growth of 0.5*1.61+1.49 = 2.295%, so that the
resulting target import to output ratio post-liberalization in the counterfactual is 3.9+2.295
= 6.195%. Figure B2 plots the resulting two trapped factors transition paths, analogous
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Figure B1: Non-OECD Patent Ratios are Small
Note: Patent fractions are computed from the NBER patent database, accessible via
Brownyn Hall’s website. Patents granted to multiple assignees are counted only once. The
classification of patents by assignee to the required OECD, non-OECD, and Chinese cate-
gories is done by the citizenship of the first assignee, and a given country’s OECD member
status as of the application year. Each series is normalized by the total number of granted
US Patent and Trademark O ce applications in the same year. The reported means are
computed over the full range 1977-2006.
to Figure 9, in the total observed import liberalization and “Half China” cases. As can
be seen immediately, the transition paths di↵er by less than the case in which all Chinese
import growth is removed, which works to reduce the marginal contribution of China to
welfare to a total of 3.3% (North) and 3.2% (South). In this alternative counterfactual, the
impact of China is equal to 20% (North) and 21% (South) of the overall welfare gains from
trade observed in the data.
Other Robustness Checks
In this section we provide the main numbers underlying the robustness checks underlying
Figure 10 in the main text. In particular, beginning from our baseline calibration, in Table
B1 we list the post-shock steady-state growth path growth rate, as well as the maximum
growth rate along the trapped-factors transition path, for a number of alternative parame-
ter choices.
15
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
2.
0
2.
5
3.
0
3.
5
A: Variety Growth
Period
An
nu
al 
%
● ● ●
●
● ● ● ●
● Baseline
Half China
Pre−Shock BGP
Baseline Post−Shock BGP
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
0.
40
0.
50
0.
60
0.
70
B: Southern Terms of Trade
Period
No
rth
/S
ou
th
● ● ●
●
● ● ● ●
Figure B2: Trade Liberalization with Half of Chinese Import Growth
Note: The figure displays the transition path in response to trade liberalization in two
scenarios. The first transition path, in solid black, “Baseline,” replicates the Trapped
Factors transition path displayed in Figure 6 above. A permanent and unanticipated trade
liberalization from   to  0 >   is announced in period 0 to become e↵ective in period 1.
The second transition path in green with triangle symbols, “Half China,” plots the Trapped
Factors transition path, starting with the same initial conditions as “Baseline” but instead
considering a counterfactual increase of   to a level between   and  0 which matches post-
liberalization imports to GDP ratios assuming that half the growth in Chinese imports into
the OECD occurs through policy substitution to non-China, non-OECD countries. The
upper horizontal solid blue line is the post-shock steady-state growth path, and the lower
horizontal dashed red line is the pre-shock steady-state growth path.
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Table B1: Growth Rate Robustness Checks
Parameter Peak Transition Path Growth (%) Post-Shock steady-state growth (%)
  = 1/1.04 2.71 2.37
  = 1/1.01 2.74 2.37
⌘ = 0.5 2.59 2.37
  = 2.0 3.04 2.32
  = 1.5 2.89 2.34
⇢ = 0.6 2.84 2.46
⇢ = 0.4 2.61 2.29
↵ = 0.5 2.74 2.32
↵ = 0.7 2.73 2.38
Baseline 2.73 2.37
Note: The first column records the parameter varied from our baseline calibration. The second
column represents the maximum annualized percentage variety growth rate over the Trapped Factors
transition path in the alternative calibrations. The third column represents the post-shock steady-
state growth path annualized percentage growth rate associated with the alternative calibration.
The baseline calibration features parameter choices of ⇢ = 0.5, ↵ = 0.667,   = 1/1.02,   = 1.0,
and ⌘ = 1.0.
Also, note that in the text we mention an alternative calibration strategy for the pre-shock
steady-state growth path growth rate. If we compute the United States per capita real
GDP growth rate over the period 1960  2001 rather than the baseline calibration window
of 1960   2010 , we obtain a pre-shock steady-state growth rate of 2.3% rather than the
baseline 2.0% . However, in this case, the peak transition path growth rate is 3.09% , and
the post-shock steady-state growth rate is 2.70% . Given the higher initial condition, this is
almost a direct translation upwards of the baseline transition path. Given the nonlinearity
of the model, such a result is not automatic.
Note that a previous version of our calibration strategy, with results published in “A
Trapped Factors Model of Innovation,” (American Economic Review: Papers and Proceed-
ings, 2013) yielded smaller dynamic impacts of trade liberalization. Our improved cali-
bration strategy here di↵ers from that earlier work in three respects. First, we consider a
model period of ten years rather than one year to match a more plausible e↵ective monopoly
length. Second, we base the calibration on imports to value added ratios rather than im-
ports to gross output ratios, since data availability for China is better for value added.
Third, instead of calibrating the post-liberalization trade openness via a “limiting” high-
est  0 which still maintained product-cycle trade (i.e. q( 0) < 1), the first two calibration
changes allow us to now directly match observed pre- and post-liberalization trade ratios
in 1997 and 2006, which results in larger growth impacts more aligned with observed trade
liberalization.
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Appendix C - Solution Technique and Equilibrium Conditions for the Calibra-
tion
Please find both replication data files for the calibration exercise, as well as code to duplicate
all of the quantitative results in the paper, on Nicholas Bloom’s website at http://www.
stanford.edu/nbloom/. We solve each of the systems of nonlinear equations laid out
below using particle swarm optimization as implemented in R . This is an extremely robust
global nonlinear optimization technique, and all solutions are computed with a summed
squared percentage error across all equations of less than 10 7 .
Steady-State growth Path
As documented in the proof of Proposition 2 , the steady-state growth path growth rate
g( ) of the open economy given trade restriction   is fully characterized by the equilibrium
innovation optimality condition
g( )  1= ⌦ 
1
a (1 + g( )) 
 
↵
 
H +
✓
 H
g( )H⇤
◆ 1
2 ↵
 
1
↵H⇤
!
.
All other long-run quantities, in particular the interest rates and exchange rate, are direct
functions of this steady-state growth path growth rate through the Euler equations and
balanced trade condition
(1 + r( )) = (1 + r⇤( )) =   1(1 + g( )) 
q( ) =
✓
 H
g( )H⇤
◆ ↵
2 ↵
 .
Fully Mobile Transition Dynamics
To compute the transition dynamics of the fully mobile model in response to a trade shock
in period 0 , starting from the steady-state growth path associated with trade restriction   ,
we first pick a horizon T . We also normalize A0 = 1 . Then, we assume that the model has
converged to the steady-state growth path associated with  0 by period T . This structure
requires that we solve for 3(T   1) prices, {qt, rt, r⇤t }Tt=2 . These 3(T   1) prices are pinned
down by 3(T   1) equations: the balanced trade condition, the Northern Euler equation,
and the Southern Euler equation, in periods t = 1, ..., T   1 . These equations are given by
qt=
✓
 H
gtH⇤
◆ ↵
2 ↵
 
✓
1 + rt
1 + r⇤t
◆ 1 ↵
2 ↵
,
✓
Ct+1
Ct
◆ 
=  (1 + rt+1),✓
C⇤t+1
C⇤t
◆ 
=  (1 + r⇤t+1).
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We note that all allocations in the transition path are a function of these three prices.
Intermediate goods prices follow the monopoly markup or competitive pricing conditions
pMt=
1 + rt
1  ↵ , pRt= (1 + rt), pIt= qt(1 + r
⇤
t )
p⇤Mt= q
 1
t
1 + rt
1  ↵ , p
⇤
Rt= (1 + r
⇤
t ), p
⇤
It= (1 + r
⇤
t ).
The final goods firms demand schedules then yield
xjt = (1  ↵) 1↵Hp 
1
↵
jt ,
x⇤jt = (1  ↵)
1
↵H⇤(p⇤jt)
  1↵ ,
The first-order condition for innovation at Northern intermediate goods firms, together
with symmetry across firms and the equilibrium price and quantity decisions laid out above,
yields the innovation optimality conditions
g  1t+1 = ⌦(1 + rt+1)
  1↵
✓
H + q
1
↵
t+1H
⇤
◆
,
which uniquely pin down the variety growth rate gt+1 as a function of terms of trade and
interest rates. Given our characterization of gt as a function of prices, it only remains to
pin down Ct and C⇤t as a function of prices. But this is easily accomplished by noting
that
Ct+M t+1(xMt+1+x
⇤
Mt+1) +Rt+1xRt+1+Zt= Y t
Yt= H
↵
⇥
Mtx
1 ↵
Mt +Rtx
1 ↵
Rt + Itx
1 ↵
It
⇤
Zt=
NX
f=1
Zft=
g t+1
 
At
C⇤t+It+1(xIt+1+x
⇤
It+1) +Rt+1x
⇤
Rt+1= Y
⇤
t
Y ⇤t = (H
⇤)↵
⇥
Mt(x
⇤
Mt)
1 ↵ +Rt(x⇤Rt)
1 ↵ + It(x⇤It)
1 ↵⇤
At+1= (1 + gt+1)At
Mt+1= gtAt
Rt+1= (1   t+1)At
It+1=  t+1At.
Since all allocations in this economy are therefore a function of the 3(T  1) prices, we can
construct the errors in 3(T   1) equations above given any input sequence of prices. The
percentage squared errors of this system of equation are minimized using particle swarm
optimization. After solving for the transition path price paths, we check to see if the cost
advantage for I goods production is maintained by the South, justifying ourM, R, I goods
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partitioning. This is equivalent to checking that, for each period
(1 + r⇤t )qt (1 + rt).
In the baseline results shown in Section 5 , we choose T = 7 .
Trapped Factors Transition Dynamics
The equilibrium conditions which we must solve to compute the transition dynamics for
the trapped factors model are identical to those in the fully mobile economy, for period
2, ..., T   1 . There are, however, di↵erences in the equilibrium conditions in the period of
the shock. In particular, there is heterogeneity in the response of the a↵ected and una↵ected
industries to the shock, and instead of solving for simply the 3(T   1) prices {qt, rt, r⇤t }Tt=2
as in the fully mobile case, we must solve for these prices and the four additional variables
{g12, g22, µ1, µ2} . These variables are patenting rates and shadow values of inputs within
Northern firms in the una↵ected industry (1) and the a↵ected industry (2). Therefore, we
must pin down 3(T   1) + 4 quantities, which we do with 3(T   1) + 4 equations:
q1=
24  0H
H
h 
n
2
 
(µ1)
↵ 1
↵ g11 +
 
n
2
 
(µ2)
↵ 1
↵ g21
i
35 ↵2 ↵  ✓1 + r1
1 + r⇤1
◆ 1 ↵
2 ↵
qt=
✓
 0H
gtH⇤
◆ ↵
2 ↵
 
✓
1 + rt
1 + r⇤t
◆ 1 ↵
2 ↵
, 2, ..., T   1✓
Ct+1
Ct
◆ 
=  (1 + rt+1), t = 1, ..., T   1✓
C⇤t+1
C⇤t
◆ 
=  (1 + r⇤t+1), t = 1, ..., T   1
(Ng11)
  1= ⌦(1 + r1)
  1↵ (µ1) 
1
↵ (H + q
1
↵
1 H
⇤)
(Ng21)
  1= ⌦(1 + r1)
  1↵ (µ2) 
1
↵ (H + q
1
↵
1 H
⇤)
1
N
(1   )(1  ↵) 1↵ (1 + r( ))  1↵H+ 1
N
g( ) 
 
+
g( )
N
(1  ↵) 2↵ (1 + r( ))  1↵ (H + q( ) 1↵H⇤)
=
1
N
(1   )(1  ↵) 1↵ (µ1)  1↵ (1 + r1) 
1
↵H+
N  1
 
 
g11
  
+g11(1  ↵)
2
↵ (1 + r1)
  1↵ (µ1) 
1
↵ (H + q
1
↵
1 H
⇤)
1
N
(1   )(1  ↵) 1↵ (1 + r( ))  1↵H+ 1
N
g( ) 
 
+
g( )
N
(1  ↵) 2↵ (1 + r( ))  1↵ (H + q( ) 1↵H⇤)
=
1
N
 2(1   )(1  ↵)
1
↵ (µ2) 
1
↵ (1 + r1)
  1↵H+
N  1
 
 
g21
  
+g21(1  ↵)
2
↵ (1 + r1)
  1↵ (µ2) 
1
↵ (H + q
1
↵
1 H
⇤).
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The first 3(T   1) equations are simply the balanced trade and Euler equations for the
Northern and Southern households in periods 1, ..., T   1 . The balanced trade condition
must be modified in period 1 to reflect the fact that flows of M goods from North to
South come from both industry 1 and industry 2 , with di↵erent prices and quantities for
each. The final four equations represent the innovation optimality conditions for firms in
industry 1 and industry 2 , as well as the trapped factors constraints for firms in each
industry. The innovation optimality conditions are simply the first-order conditions of
firms with respect to the mass of new varieties to be innovated in period 0 for use in period
1 . Note that we are defining µ1 = 1    1 and µ2 = 1    2 , where m1 1 and m1 2 are
the multipliers on the trapped factors input constraints in the optimization problem for
Northern intermediate goods firms in period 1 . A fall in µ below 1 represents a fall in the
shadow value of inputs for an intermediate goods firm. Also, if Mf1 is the number of new
patents innovated by a firm in industry f in period 0 for use in period 1 , we are following
the conventions gf1 =
Mf1
A0
, and imposing the consistency condition
g1=
✓
N
2
◆
(g11+g
2
1).
The trapped factors constraints are simply the input demands for R goods production
and M goods innovation and production expenditure pre-shock (left-hand side) and post-
shock (right-hand side). The input constraints di↵er across industries because the R goods
available in the post-shock period in industry 2 for production are reduced by the factor
 2 , where  2 satisfies
1 +  2
2
=
1   0
1    ,
which is the consistency condition discussed in the equilibrium definition. Also, the right-
hand side on the trapped factors constraints take into account the following optimal pricing
rules in the period of the shock:
p1M1 = µ
1 1 + r1
1  ↵ , p
1
R1 = (1 + r1),
p2M1 = µ
2 1 + r1
1  ↵ , p
2
R1 = (1 + r1).
The demand conditions are identical to those laid out in the fully mobile section. Interme-
diate goods firm innovation costs on the right hand side of the trapped factors constraint
are given by
Z11=
N  1
 
 
g11
  
Z21=
N  1
 
 
g21
  
,
which is a direct application of the definition of the innovation cost function. All of the
other quantities needed for construction of the Euler equation errors and balanced trade
conditions are identical to those in the fully mobile economy, with the exception of the
resource constraints in the North and South in periods 0 and 1 which must be modified
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to read
Y0= C0+
✓
N
2
◆
g11A0(x
1
M1+x
⇤1
M1)+
✓
N
2
◆
g21A0(x
2
M1+x
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M1)+
✓
N
2
◆
1   
2
A0x
1
R1+
✓
N
2
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(1   ) 2
2
A0x
2
R1
+Z11+Z
2
1
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⇤
0+(1   0)A0x⇤R1+ 0A0(x⇤I1+xI1)
Y1= H
↵
✓
N
2
◆
g11A0(x
1
M1)
1 ↵ +
✓
N
2
◆
g21A0(x
2
M1)
1 ↵ +
✓
N
2
◆
1   
2
A0(x
1
R1)
1 ↵+✓
N
2
◆
(1   ) 2
2
A0(x
2
R1)
1 ↵ +  0A0x1 ↵I1
 
Y ⇤1 = (H
⇤)↵
✓
N
2
◆
g11A0(x
⇤1
M1)
1 ↵ +
✓
N
2
◆
g21A0(x
⇤2
M1)
1 ↵ + (1   0)A0(x⇤R1)1 ↵ +  0A0(x⇤I1)1 ↵
 
.
After computing the transition path in the above manner, we must verify that µ1, µ2 <
1 , justifying our imposition of the trapped factors inequality constraint as an equality
constraint. We must also check the Southern cost dominance condition for I goods in each
period, i.e.
min (µ1, µ2)(1 + r1)   q1(1 + r⇤1),
(1 + rt)   qt(1 + r⇤t ), t = 2, .., T   1,
q0, qT 1.
Welfare Calculations
We illustrate our method of computing the consumption equivalent variation by explicitly
laying out the formulas used to compute the welfare gains to trade from the fully mobile
trade shock. All other welfare calculations are similar.
WNS=
1X
t=0
 t
 
CNSt
 1  
1    ,W
⇤NS=
1X
t=0
 t
 
C⇤NSt
 1  
1   
WFM=
1X
t=0
 t
 
CFMt
 1  
1    ,W
⇤FM=
1X
t=0
 t
 
C⇤FMt
 1  
1    ,
where the consumption allocations on the fully mobile “FM” computed transition path
from 0, ..., T   1 are directly computed and consumption is assumed to grow at the rate
g( 0) for all economies from period T onwards. The no shock “NS” case is consumption
assuming that allocations are those of the pre-shock steady-state growth path with constant
growth at rate g( ). Then, we solve for x and x⇤ ,
1X
t=0
 t
 
CNSt (1 + x)
 1  
1    =
1X
t=0
 t
 
CFMt
 1  
1    ,
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1X
t=0
 t
 
C⇤NSt (1 + x⇤)
 1  
1    =
1X
t=0
 t
 
C⇤FMt
 1  
1    .
The welfare numbers reported in the text are 100x and 100x⇤ .
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Appendix D - Semi-endogenous Growth Model
In this Appendix we consider the semi-endogenous growth model approach to show that
it delivers quantitatively similar results to our fully endogenous growth model. As docu-
mented in Jones (1995a,b) the implication of a model like that considered in the main text,
with “strong scale e↵ects” implying that the long-term growth rate is dependent upon the
level of human capital, is rejected by the time series evidence which documents the con-
currence of rising populations and researcher numbers with constant growth rates. Jones
proposes a small modification to the production function for new varieties, or alternatively,
to the cost function for innovation, which implies smaller returns from the existing stock
of varieties in the production of new patents. This change to the model converts the struc-
ture into a semi-endogenous growth model with “weak scale e↵ects,” since the long-term
growth rate is now proportional to the growth rate of human capital rather than the level of
human capital. Analogously, in our context with product-cycle trade, such a modification
of the model leads to long-term growth rates proportional to human capital growth rates
and, crucially, independent of the trade liberalization policy  . As we will see, however, a
reasonable calibration of a semi-endogenous growth model consistent with the data on both
per-capita growth rates and population growth displays extremely long transition dynamics
and considerable temporary e↵ects on variety growth rates from trade liberalization. There-
fore, the temporary growth e↵ects of liberalization (and the permanent level e↵ects), imply
similar results for welfare regardless of whether one considers a strong or weak scale e↵ects
model. Given that the model with strong scale e↵ects delivers closed-form expressions for
the steady-state growth path growth rates dependent upon the trade policy parameter  ,
and given that the transition dynamics for the strong scale e↵ects model are of a more
reasonable length, we prefer to work with the strong scale e↵ects model as our baseline
version.
Model
We now lay out the model structure and equilibrium concept in the semi-endogenous growth
framework, for the fully mobile environment only.
Population and Human Capital: We assume that in the North and in the South there is a
continuum of identical households of measure 1 , each with an expanding set of members
[0, Lt] and [0, L⇤t ] , respectively. We further assume that there is an constant level of human
capital per member of the population, i.e. Ht = hLt and H⇤t = hL⇤t , respectively. This
assumption implies that preferences of the CRRA form defined over per-capita consumption
or over consumption expressed relative to human capital di↵er only by a constant, and for
convenience we express preferences as per unit of human capital.27
Northern Households: Given a sequence of wages wt , firm stock prices qft , firm div-
idends Dft , and interest rates rt , a Northern household supplies labor inelastically and
chooses consumption Ct , portfolio positions Sft , and bond purchases Bt+1 to solve the
problem
max
Ct,Bt+1,Sft
1X
t=0
 t
⇣
Ct
Ht
⌘1  
1   
27Note that we omit below a term multiplying per capita preferences by the size of the population, which
would be proportional to H⇤t given our assumptions. Such an assumption, as will be seen below, results in
a level shift in interest rates. However, and importantly, our assumption prevents the mechanical inflation
of the welfare gains from trade liberalization (relative to our baseline strong scale e↵ects model with no
population growth) simply because liberalization gains occur in the future with a larger population. In
unreported results, however, we also solved an alternative model with per-capita preferences weighted by
population size. Predictably, this resulted in larger welfare gains from trade liberalization.
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Ct +Bt+1 +
NX
f=1
qft(Sft   Sft 1)  wtHt + (1 + rt)Bt +
NX
f=1
SftDft
Southern Households: Given a sequence of wages w⇤t , firm stock prices q⇤ft , firm dividends
D⇤ft , and interest rates r
⇤
t , a Southern household supplies labor inelastically and chooses
consumption C⇤t , portfolio positions S⇤ft , and bond purchases B
⇤
t+1 to solve the problem
max
C⇤t ,B⇤t+1,S⇤ft
1X
t=0
 t
⇣
C⇤t
H⇤t
⌘1  
1   
C⇤t +B
⇤
t+1 +
NX
f=1
q⇤ft(S
⇤
ft   S⇤ft 1)  w⇤tH⇤t + (1 + r⇤t )B⇤t +
NX
f=1
S⇤ftD
⇤
ft
Northern Final Goods Firms: Taking as given a sequence of wages wt and intermediate
goods prices pjt for each variety j 2 [0, At] as given, perfectly competitive Northern final
goods firms choose input demands Ht and xjt to solve the static problem
max
Ht,xjt
Yt  
Z At
0
pjtxjtdj   wtHt
max
Ht,xjt
H↵t
Z At
0
x1 ↵jt dj  
Z At
0
pjtxjtdj   wtHt
Southern Final Goods Firms: Taking as given a sequence of wages w⇤t and intermediate
goods prices p⇤jt for each variety j 2 [0, At] as given, perfectly competitive Southern final
goods firms choose input demands H⇤t and x⇤jt to solve the static problem
max
H⇤t ,x⇤jt
Y ⇤t  
Z At
0
p⇤jtx
⇤
jtdj   w⇤tH⇤t
max
H⇤t ,x⇤jt
(H⇤t )
↵
Z At
0
(x⇤jt)
1 ↵dj  
Z At
0
p⇤jtx
⇤
jtdj   w⇤tH⇤t
Northern Intermediate Goods Firms: Taking as given a sequence of interest rates rt ,
along with aggregate variety stocks At , as well as Northern and Southern final goods firms’
intermediate demand schedules, each of N Northern intermediate goods firms f makes
monopoly production xMjt+1 and x⇤Mjt+1 , perfectly competitive production xRjt+1 , and
innovation decisions Mft+1 to solve the following problem
max
xRjt+1,xMjt+1,x⇤Mjt+1,Mft+1
1X
t=0
mtDft,
Dft + Zft +
Z
Aft+1
(xjt+1 + x
⇤
jt+1)dj 
Z
Aft
pjt(xjt + x
⇤
jt)dj,
where mt+1mt =
1
1+rt+1
or mt = ⇧t⌧=1
1
1+r⌧
. This is equivalent to stock price or value
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maximization as can be seen from iteration on the Northern Household’s first order condition
for Sft and insertion of the Northern household first order condition for Bt+1. At all times,
the innovation cost function is given by
Zft = ⌫M
 
ft+1A
1   ⇢
t ,
where   = 1⇢ and   2 (0, 1) , and ⌫ = N
  1
  is again a scaling constant discussed in more
detail below. This innovation cost function is identical to the strong scale e↵ects innovation
cost function, with the exception that   < 1 here and   = 1 in that case.
Southern Intermediate Goods Firms: Taking as given a sequence of interest rates r⇤t ,
as well as Northern and Southern final goods firms’ intermediate demand schedules, each
Southern intermediate goods firm makes perfectly competitive production xIjt , x⇤Ijt , and
x⇤Rjt decisions to solve the following problem
max
xIjt,x⇤Ijt,x
⇤
Rjt
1X
t=0
m⇤tD
⇤
ft,
D⇤ft+
Z
Aft+1
(xjt+1+x
⇤
jt+1)dj 
Z
Aft
pjt(xjt+x
⇤
jt)dj
where
m⇤t+1
m⇤t
= 11+r⇤t+1
or m⇤t = ⇧t⌧=1
1
1+r⇤⌧
. This is equivalent to stock price or value
maximization as can be seen from iteration on the Southern Household’s first order condition
for Sft and insertion of the Southern Household’s first order condition for B⇤t+1 .
Terms of Trade Notation/No Arbitrage Condition:
pjt= qtp
⇤
jt
Trade Restrictions and Monopoly Structure: There is one-period monopoly protection
for any newly innovatedM goods, trade restriction for an exogenously set proportion 1  t
of o↵-patent goods labeled R goods, and imports from South to North of the exogenously
set proportion  t of o↵-patent goods labeled I goods.
Equilibrium Summary
• Some sequence of  t is exogenously set by the Northern government
• Northern households optimize consumption, savings, and equity purchase decisions
• Southern households optimize consumption, savings, and equity purchase decisions
• Perfectly competitive Northern final goods sector optimizes human capital and inter-
mediate goods demand
• Perfectly competitive Southern final goods sector optimizes human capital and inter-
mediate goods demand
• Northern intermediate goods firms optimizeM goods innovation,M goods monopoly
production, and perfectly competitive R goods production decisions
• Southern intermediate goods firms optimize perfectly competitive R and I goods
production decisions
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• Trade is balanced: ItpItxIt =MtpMtx⇤Mt
• Bond markets clear: Bt = B⇤t = 0
• Equity markets clear: Sft + S⇤ft = 1
• Human capital market clear HDt = Ht , (H⇤)Dt = H⇤t
• Final goods market clears/resource constraint is satisfied in the North
Yt= H
↵
t
Z At
0
x1 ↵jt dj = Ct+
Z
At+1
(xjt+1+x
⇤
jt+1)dj+
NX
f=1
Zft
• Final goods market clears/resource constraint is satisfied in the South
Yt= H
↵
t
Z At
0
x1 ↵jt dj = C
⇤
t+
Z
At+1
(xjt+1+x
⇤
jt+1)dj
• Consistency conditions hold
NX
f=1
Mft+1=M t+1= At+1 At
 At= It, (1   )At= Rt
H⇤t
Ht
=
H⇤0
H0
=
H¯
H⇤
• Southern cost dominance for I goods
qt(1 + r
⇤
t ) < (1 + rt)
Equilibrium Conditions for Reference
For later reference in the proof of Proposition D1 , we now list the equilibrium conditions
in this environment. Northern Households’ (HH) First Order Conditions (FOC)
 tH  1t C
  
t =  t
 t = (1 + rt+1) t+1
 t (Dft   qft) +  t+1qft+1 = 0
! (1 + rt+1) = 1
 
Ht+1
Ht
✓
Ct+1
Ht+1
Ht
Ct
◆ 
=
1
 
(1 + gH)
✓
ct+1
ct
◆ 
, ct ⌘ Ct
Ht
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! qft =
1X
t=0
mtDft, mt ⌘  t 0 =
tY
⌧=1
1
1 + r⌧
Southern Households’ FOC’s
! (1 + r⇤t+1) =
1
 
H⇤t+1
H⇤t
✓
C⇤t+1
H⇤t+1
H⇤t
C⇤t
◆ 
=
1
 
(1 + gH)
✓
c⇤t+1
c⇤t
◆ 
, c⇤t ⌘
C⇤t
H⇤t
! q⇤ft =
1X
t=0
m⇤tD
⇤
ft, m
⇤
t ⌘
 ⇤t
 ⇤0
=
tY
⌧=1
1
1 + r⇤⌧
Northern Final Goods Firm FOC’s
(1  ↵)H↵t x ↵jt   pjt = 0! xjt = (1  ↵)
1
↵ p
  1↵
jt Ht
↵H↵ 1t x
1 ↵
jt   wt = 0
Southern Final Goods Firm FOC’s
(1  ↵)(H⇤t )↵(x⇤jt) ↵   p⇤jt = 0! x⇤jt = (1  ↵)
1
↵ (p⇤jt)
  1↵H⇤t
↵(H⇤t )
↵ 1(x⇤jt)
1 ↵   w⇤t = 0
Northern Intermediate Goods Firm FOC’s
max
xMt+1,Mft+1,xRt+1
1X
t=0
mtDft
Dft =
Z
Aft
pjt(xjt + x
⇤
jt)dj   Zft  
Z
Aft+1
(xjt+1 + x
⇤
jt+1)dj
 mt

@
@Mft+1
Zft + xMt+1 + x
⇤
Mt+1
 
+mt+1pMt+1(xMt+1 + x
⇤
Mt+1) = 0
pMt+1 = argmax
p
 mt(1 ↵) 1↵ p  1↵ (Ht+1+q
1
↵
t+1H
⇤
t+1)+mt+1(1 ↵)
1
↵ p1 
1
↵ (Ht+1+q
1
↵
t+1H
⇤
t+1)
pMt+1 =
mt
mt+1
1
1  ↵
 mt +mt+1pRt+1 = 0
! pMt+1 = 1 + rt+1
1  ↵ , xMt+1 = (1 ↵)
2
↵ (1+rt+1)
  1↵Ht+1, x⇤Mt+1 = (1 ↵)
2
↵ (1+rt+1)
  1↵ q
1
↵
t+1H
⇤
t+1
! pRt+1 = 1 + rt+1, xRt+1 = (1  ↵) 1↵ (1 + rt+1)  1↵Ht+1
! @
@Mft+1
Zft+1 = g
  1
At+1A
1  
⇢
t , imposes symmetry gAft+1 = (1/N)gAt+1
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! Zt =
NX
f=1
Zft =
g At+1A
1+ 1  ⇢
t
 
, imposes symmetry gAft+1 = (1/N)gAt+1
! g  1At+1A
1  
⇢
t = ⌦(1 + rt+1)
  1↵
✓
Ht+1 + q
1
↵
t+1H
⇤
t+1
◆
Southern Intermediate Goods Firm FOC’s
max
1X
t=0
m⇤tD
⇤
ft,
D⇤ft =
Z
Aft
pjt(xjt + x
⇤
jt)dj  
Z
Aft+1
(xjt+1 + x
⇤
jt+1)dj
 m⇤t +m⇤t+1p⇤Rt+1 = 0
 m⇤t +m⇤t+1p⇤It+1 = 0
! p⇤Rt+1 = (1 + r⇤t+1), x⇤Rt+1 = (1  ↵)
1
↵ (1 + r⇤t+1)
  1↵H⇤t+1
! p⇤It+1 = (1 + r⇤t+1), pIt+1 = qt+1p⇤It+1, x⇤It+1 = (1  ↵)
1
↵ (1 + r⇤t+1)
  1↵H⇤t+1,
xIt+1 = (1  ↵) 1↵ (1 + r⇤t+1) 
1
↵ q
  1↵
t+1Ht+1
Balanced Trade Condition
ItpItxIt =MtpMtx
⇤
Mt
 tAt 1qt(1 + r⇤t )(1  ↵)
1
↵ (1 + r⇤t )
  1↵ q 
1
↵
t Ht = gAtAt 1
1 + rt
1  ↵ (1  ↵)
2
↵ (1 + rt)
  1↵ q
1
↵
t H
⇤
t
qt =
✓
 tHt
gAtH⇤t
◆ ↵
2 ↵
✓
1 + rt
1 + r⇤t
◆ 1 ↵
2 ↵
 ,  = (1  ↵)↵ 12 ↵
Northern Resource Constraint
Yt = H
↵
t
⇥
Mtx
1 ↵
Mt +Rtx
1 ↵
Rt + Itx
1 ↵
It
⇤
= Ct +Mt+1
 
xMt+1 + x
⇤
Mt+1
 
+Rt+1xRt+1 + Zt
Southern Resource Constraint
Y ⇤t = (H
⇤
t )
↵
⇥
Mt(x
⇤
Mt)
1 ↵ +Rt(x⇤Rt)
1 ↵ + It(x⇤It)
1 ↵⇤
= C⇤t +Rt+1x
⇤
Rt+1 + It+1(xIt+1 + x
⇤
It+1)
Consistency Conditions and Terms of Trade Notation Convention
Mt+1 = At+1  At, Rt+1 = (1   t+1)At, It+1 =  t+1At
Mt+1 =
NX
f=1
Mft+1, pjt = qtp
⇤
jt
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Southern Cost Dominance for I Goods
qt(1 + r
⇤
t )  (1 + rt)
Proposition D1 A steady-state growth path with constant   exists and is unique. On
this steady-state growth path the growth rate gA of varieties satisfies
(1 + gA)
1  
⇢ = (1 + gH),
interest rates satisfy
1 + r = 1 + r⇤ =
1
 
(1 + gH)(1 + gA)
 ,
and the terms of trade satisfies
q =
✓
 
gA
H¯
H⇤
◆ ↵
2 ↵
 , = (1  ↵)↵ 12 ↵ .
On this unique steady-state growth path, output and consumption grow as the factor (1 +
gH)(1+gA) and per capita consumption has growth rate equal to the number of varieties gA.
Proof of Proposition D1: Semi-endogenous Steady-state Growth Path As-
sume constant growth rates of quantities and a constant  . Then the HH Euler equations
yield
1 + r =
1
 
(1 + gH)(1 + gc)
 
1 + r⇤ =
1
 
(1 + gH)(1 + gc⇤)
 ,
which implies that interest rates are constant. But the BT condition is then
q =
✓
 
gA
H¯
H⇤
◆ ↵
2 ↵ ✓ 1 + r
1 + r⇤
◆ 1 ↵
2 ↵
 ,
which implies that the terms of trade are constant. But the innovation FOC is
g  1A A
1  
⇢
t = ⌦(1 + r)
  1↵
⇣
Ht+1 + q
1
↵H⇤t+1
⌘
.
LHS /
✓
(1 + gA)
⇣
1  
⇢
⌘◆t
, RHS / (1 + gH)t
! (1 + gA)
1  
⇢ = (1 + gH) on any BGP.
Now note that prices of all goods are constant because they are functions of interest and
terms of trade, so the intensive demand margins are also constant multiples of human
capital. In particular,
xMt = (1  ↵) 2↵ (1 + r)  1↵Ht, x⇤Mt = (1  ↵)
2
↵ (1 + r) 
1
↵ q
1
↵H⇤t
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xRt = (1  ↵) 1↵ (1 + r)  1↵Ht, x⇤Rt = (1  ↵)
1
↵ (1 + r⇤) 
1
↵H⇤t
xIt = (1  ↵) 1↵ (1 + r⇤)  1↵ q  1↵Ht
x⇤It = (1  ↵)
1
↵ (1 + r⇤) 
1
↵H⇤t
Note also that by the consistency conditions Mt = gAAt 1, Rt = (1    )At 1, It =  At 1
are all constant multiples of At (given the fact that At 1 = 11+gAAt ).
Yt = H
↵
t
⇥
Mtx
1 ↵
Mt +Rtx
1 ↵
Rt + Itx
1 ↵
It
⇤
Yt / HtAt / ((1 + gH)(1 + gA))t
Now from the uses identity we also have
Yt = Ct +Mt+1
 
xMt+1 + x
⇤
Mt+1
 
+Rt+1xRt+1 + Zt
But from above
Mt+1
 
xMt+1 + x
⇤
Mt+1
  / HtAt
Rt+1xRt+1 / HtAt
Zt =
g A
 
A
1+ 1  ⇢
t / A
1+ 1  ⇢
t /
⇣
(1 + gA)
1+ 1  ⇢
⌘t
But since 1 + gH = (1 + gA)
1  
⇢ on any BGP by the innovation FOC, we have
Zt/ ((1 + gH)(1 + gA))t ,
Therefore, we have
Ct/ ((1 + gH)(1 + gA))t , ct/ (1 + gA)t ,
implying that gc = gA , so that
1 + r =
1
 
(1 + gH)(1 + gA)
 .
Now similar reasoning shows that
Y ⇤t / H⇤tAt, C⇤t/ H⇤tAt, c⇤t/ At,
so that
1 + r⇤ = 1 + r
q =
✓
 
gA
H¯
H⇤
◆ ↵
2 ↵ ✓ 1 + r
1 + r⇤
◆ 1 ↵
2 ↵
 =
✓
 
gA
H¯
H⇤
◆ ↵
2 ↵
 .
Note that this final expression implies that for su ciently small  , q < 1 , which is equivalent
along the BGP to Southern cost dominance in I goods. Finally, uniqueness follows from
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the innovation FOC
g  1A A
1  
⇢
t = ⌦(1 + r)
  1↵
⇣
Ht+1 + q
1
↵H⇤t+1
⌘
.
After dividing both sides by (1 + gH)t , we have that
g  1A / ⌦(1 + r) 
1
↵
⇣
H1 + q
1
↵H⇤1
⌘
.
Since   > 1 , the LHS is increasing in gA . Since r is increasing in gA and q is decreasing
in gA , there is at most one solution for gA . Since all other prices are functions of gA , they
are unique as well. Existence is shown by noting that the increasing LHS asymptotes to 1
as gA !1 and to 0 as gA ! 0 . The decreasing RHS asymptotes to 1 as gA ! 0 (see
the formula for q ) and to 0 as gA !1 (see the formulas for r and q ). By the continuity
and monotonicity of everything involved, as well as the intermediate value theorem, gA
exists uniquely. This completes the proof.
Calibration Strategy
We would like to consider, as in the Fully Mobile environment described above, the transition
path associated with a shock from the balanced growth path associated with trade policy
parameter   to the balanced growth path associated with trade policy parameter  0 . As
before, we will consider the impact of a permanent and unanticipated shock moving the
policy parameter from   to  0 . The timing conventions are identical to those discussed
in the Fully Mobile trade shock timing section in the main text. According to the OECD
National Accounts Main Aggregates dataset and Population dataset, as current in early
May 2013, the average total OECD real GDP per-capita growth rate from 1984  2000 is
equal to approximately 2.37% per year. The average OECD population growth rates over
this same period is approximately equal to 0.78% per year. Now note that the steady-
state growth path relationship above between gH and gA is a logarithmic equation whose
solution yields
  = 1  ⇢ log(1 + gH)
log(1 + gA)
.
Above, note that gA and gH are 10-year versions of the annual growth rates taken
from OECD data. Now, with the calibration ⇢ = 0.5 from above, we have that   = 0.83 .
The remaining parameters to calibrate in the model are   ,   , ↵ , H¯
⇤
H , H 1 ,   , and  
0 .
The values for ↵ = 2/3,   = 1 ,   = 1/1.02 , and H
⇤
t
Ht
= 2.96 are unchanged from before.
The final three parameters which must be calibrated are   ,  0 , and H1 . We jointly
pick these three parameters so that the following three conditions hold: IY  ,BGP = 3.9%,
I
Y  ,BGP
= 7.0% , and the innovation first order condition for the pre-shock   steady-state
growth path is satisfied. The first two conditions require that the model match the non-
OECD to OECD trade shares which the strong scale e↵ects model is calibrated to match.
The final condition requires that the scaling of varieties to human capital at the initial
condition of the transition path is consistent with the equilibrium conditions. Given the
calibration, the transition path in response to a fully mobile shock moving the economy
from   to  0 can be written as a minimization problem in rt, r⇤t , and qt , as in the strong
scale e↵ects case. The endpoints of each series are known, because they reflect steady-state
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growth path values.
Table D1: Semi-endogenous Transition Path Summary
Quantity Value
max gAt 2.8%
(max gAt) gA 0.45%
Half Life 16 periods
r 5.2%
q( ) 0.46
q( 0) 0.68
I
Y  
3.9%
I
Y  0 7.0%
 W 16.5%
 W ⇤ 15.4%
Note: The table above displays a summary of the quantitative exercise performed for the semi-
endogenous model given a calibrated trade liberalization. The long-run annualized value of the
interest rate is given as r , and all other quantities are computed from a transition path in response
to an unanticipated, permanent movement of trade policy   to  0 >   , where   and  0 are chosen
to match the movement in low-cost imports to OECD GDP observed in the data from 1997-2006
and also displayed in the table. The pre- and post-shock Southern terms of trade q( ) and q( 0)
vary permanently with the trade policy parameter and reflect the steady-state growth path for the
indicated policy. The maximum level of variety growth max gAt and the maximum di↵erence in
variety growth from its long-run level over the transition path are displayed in the first two rows,
while the half life of the shock to variety growth induced by trade liberalization is indicated in the
third row. The model calibration of a period is one decade.  W and  W ⇤ refer to the permanent
consumption equivalent of trade liberalization for a Northern and Southern household, respectively.
In particular, this percentage is the permanent fraction by which consumption for a household must
increase in each period without the trade shock to make the household indi↵erent to the allocation
with trade liberalization.
Results
Figure D1 plots the transition path for the semi-endogenous economy in response to the
trade liberalization, for variety growth, the Southern terms of trade, and Northern and
Southern per-capita output growth. In fact, the transition is not complete 25 periods.
Recall that a period in this calibration is one decade, so this represents a transition path
which is not complete 250 years after the initial shock. However, the broad pattern of the
transition path is similar to that observed in the strong scale e↵ects model. In particular, we
have that in response to trade liberalization, the appreciation of the Southern terms of trade
due to the increased flow of I goods from South to North causes an increase in the variety
growth rate, as well as Northern and Southern output growth rates. Variety growth rates
immediately begin to fall, however, as the gains from increased variety levels fade in the
semi-endogenous innovation cost function. This process is incredibly persistent, however,
because the level of   implied by OECD evidence on per capita GDP and population growth
rates is quite close to 1 , yielding something quantitatively similar to the strong scale e↵ects
model. Because of consumption smoothing and the implied movements in interest rates,
Northern and Southern output growth rates are smoother than variety growth, yet just as
persistent. Finally, as the variety growth rate and interest rates begin to return to their
normal long-run levels, the Southern terms of trade q slowly converges to its new long-run
value associated with  0 .
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Figure D1: Semi-endogenous Growth Model Trade Liberalization
Note: The figure displays the Fully Mobile transition path in the semi-endogenous growth
model in response to a permanent, unanticipated trade liberalization from policy parameter
  to  0 >  , which is announced in period 0 to become e↵ective in period 1. Intermediate
goods firms may respond to the information about trade liberalization without short-term
adjustment costs. The solid black line is the transition path, the upper horizontal solid
blue line is the post-shock steady-state growth path, and the lower horizontal dashed red
line is the pre-shock steady-state growth path. Note that since the semi-endogenous growth
model’s value for variety growth and output growth in the long run does not vary with
trade policy, there is only one steady-state growth marker for these series.
More precisely, in Table D1 we present the detailed statistics associated with trade
liberalization in the semi-endogenous model. In particular, note that the half-life of the
shock to the variety growth rate is 16 periods, or 160 years. Also, note that the welfare gains
to the North and to the South from liberalization, 16.5% and 15.4% , which are permanent
consumption equivalent welfare gains defined analogously to before, are qualitatively similar
to those obtained from the strong scale e↵ects model.
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Appendix E - R&D Cost Externalities
As noted in the main text, to allow for the problem that firms face in coordinating search
and innovation in larger teams, we allow for a form of diminishing marginal productivity for
the inputs to innovation in any given period. This diminishing marginal productivity can
be internal in the sense that it depends only on the inputs devoted to innovation within the
firm, or it could be external in the sense that it depends on total inputs devoted to innovation
in the economy. We start first with the fully internal case, which is our benchmark structure
considered in the main paper. In this case, the number of new designs at firm f is a function
of innovation expenditures Zft within firm f :
Mft+1 = (Zft)
⇢A1 ⇢t ,
where 0 < ⇢ < 1. This yields an internal R&D cost function given by
Zft = IC(M
 
ft+1, At) =M
 
ft+1A
1  
t ,
where   = 1⇢ > 1 and the function name IC is a mnemonic for Internal Costs. The other
extreme, which is the extension we consider in this section, would be to assume that the
costs of innovation for any one firm depend on the total amount of innovation that is taking
place in the economy because independent firms could develop redundant designs. In this
case, with fully external increasing costs, the aggregate production function for innovation
is given by
Mt+1 = (Zt)
⇢A1 ⇢t ,
where Zt is the aggregate quantity of final good devoted to innovation. The corresponding
aggregate cost function is
Z =M t+1A
1  
t .
In this case, the cost per new patent to an individual firm would be the average economy-
wide cost of innovation
Zft = EC(Mft+1,Mt+1, At) =
Mft+1
Mt+1
M t+1A
1  
t .
where EC is a mnemonic for external costs. To allow for intermediate degrees of internal
and external costs of innovation, we nest these two versions in a cost function for firm f of
the form
Zft = ⌫ (IC(•))⌘ (EC(•))1 ⌘ ,
where 0  ⌘  1 and the inputs for the functions IC(•) and EC(•) are as given
above. As ⌘ increases, the cost function exhibits a steeper marginal cost curve within each
firm, with less redundancy across firms and hence weaker innovation externalities. The
fully internal and fully external innovation cost benchmarks are the cases of ⌘ = 1 and
⌘ = 0, respectively. The introduction of ⌘ requires a slight change in the scaling constant
⌫ to deliver invariance of steady-state growth path growth rates to N, ⌘, ⇢ . However, the
equilibrium definition and structure is identical to that considered above, except for the
obvious modifications to the innovation first-order conditions and resource constraints. For
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the Fully Mobile environment, the symmetry across firms causes invariance of the aggregate
allocation to the level of ⌘ . Only the Trapped Factors transition dynamics are modified.
For completeness, we reproduce below the modified system of equations solved numerically
to compute the transition path in the Trapped Factors case with an arbitrary level of ⌘ .
These equations are the direct analogues of those in Appendix C above.
q2=
24  0H
H
h 
n
2
 
(µ1)
↵ 1
↵ g12 +
 
n
2
 
(µ2)
↵ 1
↵ g22
i
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min (µ1, µ2)(1 + r2)   q2(1 + r⇤2),
(1 + rt)   qt(1 + r⇤t ), t = 3, .., T,
q1, qT+1 1.
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Appendix F - Southern Innovation
In the baseline model we assume that the Southern economy cannot innovate. In this ap-
pendix we analyze an economy with Southern innovation, allowed under the assumption
that Southern firms produce patents or ideas with a di↵erent productivity than Northern
firms. The remainder of the structure of the economy is identical to the baseline environ-
ment. After laying out the optimality conditions characterizing this equilibrium, we first
calibrate the relative productivities of Northern and Southern innovation to match observed
patent rates. Then, we show that the quantitative impact of a trade liberalization in a global
economy with Southern innovation is similar to the baseline case.
Model
First, we’ll overview the structure of the economy, outlining each agent and their optimiza-
tion problem. In particular, the North and South are populated by a set of households
which provide labor and make consumption and savings choices. Northern and Southern
final good sectors operates a constant returns to scale competitive technology, while interme-
diate goods firms in both economies innovate new varieties and supply existing intermediate
goods varieties to the final goods sectors. Balanced trade in intermediate goods takes place
between each economy, subject to various exogenous trade restrictions.
Northern Household
Taking wages wt, interest rates rt, intermediate goods firm stock prices qft, and inter-
mediate goods firm dividends Dft as given, a unit measure of identical Northern households
supplies labor with in e↵ective units H inelastically and chooses consumption Ct, portfolio
positions Sft, and bond purchases Bt+1 to maximize their discounted utility as follows:
max
Ct,Bt+1,Sft
1X
t=0
 t
C1  t
1   
Ct +Bt+1 +
NX
f=1
qft(Sft   Sft 1)  wtH + (1 + rt)Bt +
NX
f=1
Dft.
Southern Household
Taking wages w⇤t , interest rates r⇤t , intermediate goods firm stock prices q⇤ft, and inter-
mediate goods firm dividends D⇤ft as given, a unit measure of identical Southern households
supplies labor with in e↵ective units H⇤ inelastically as chooses consumption C⇤t , portfolio
positions S⇤ft, and bond purchases B
⇤
t+1 to maximize their discounted utility as follows:
max
C⇤t ,B⇤t+1,S⇤ft
1X
t=0
 t
C⇤t
1  
1   
C⇤t +B
⇤
t+1 +
NX
f=1
q⇤ft(S
⇤
ft   S⇤ft 1)  w⇤tH + (1 + r⇤t )B⇤t +
NX
f=1
D⇤ft.
Northern Final Goods Sector
The Northern final good serves as a numeraire in this economy. Taking wages wt and
intermediate goods prices in Northern units pjt as given, the Northern final goods sector
chooses labor input HDt and intermediate goods inputs x
D
jt optimally in order to maximize
their profits as follows:
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max
HDt ,{xDjt}
Yt  
Z At
0
pjtx
D
jtdj   wtHDt
Yt = H
D
t
↵
Z At
0
xDjt
1 ↵
dj.
Southern Final Goods Sector
Taking wages w⇤t and intermediate goods prices in Southern units p⇤jt as given, the
Southern final goods sector chooses labor input H⇤t
D and intermediate goods inputs x⇤jt
D
optimally in order to maximize their profits as follows:
max
H⇤t
D,{x⇤jtD}
Y ⇤t  
Z At
0
p⇤jtx
⇤
jt
Ddj   w⇤tH⇤t D
Y ⇤t = H
⇤
t
D↵
Z At
0
x⇤jt
D1 ↵dj.
Northern Intermediate Goods Firms
Taking as given a sequence of interest rates rt, along with aggregate variety stocks
At, as well as Northern and Southern final goods firms’ intermediate demand schedules,
each of N Northern intermediate goods firms f makes monopoly production xMjt+1 and
x⇤Mjt+1, perfectly competitive production xRjt+1, and innovation decisions Mft+1 to solve
the following problem
max
xRjt+1,xMjt+1,x⇤Mjt+1,Mft+1
1X
t=0
mtDft,
Dft + Zft +
Z
Aft+1
(xjt+1 + x
⇤
jt+1)dj 
Z
Aft
pjt(xjt + x
⇤
jt)dj,
where mt+1mt =
1
1+rt+1
or mt = ⇧t⌧=1
1
1+r⌧
. This is equivalent to stock price or value max-
imization as can be seen from iteration on the Northern Household’s first order condition
for Sft and insertion of the Northern household first order condition for Bt+1. At all times,
the innovation cost function is given by
Zft = ⌫M
 
ft+1A
1  
t ,   =
1
⇢
, ⌫ =
N  1
 
.
Southern Intermediate Goods Firms
Taking as given a sequence of interest rates r⇤t , along with aggregate variety stocks
At, as well as Northern and Southern final goods firms’ intermediate demand schedules,
each of N Southern intermediate goods firms f makes monopoly production x⇤M⇤jt+1 and
x⇤M⇤jt+1, perfectly competitive production x
⇤
Rjt+1, and innovation decisions M
⇤
ft+1 to solve
the following problem
max
xRjt+1,xM⇤jt+1,x⇤M⇤jt+1,M
⇤
ft+1
1X
t=0
mtDft,
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D⇤ft + Z
⇤
ft +
Z
A⇤ft+1
(xjt+1 + x
⇤
jt+1)dj 
Z
Aft
p⇤jt(xjt + x
⇤
jt)dj,
where
m⇤t+1
m⇤t
= 11+r⇤t+1
or m⇤t = ⇧t⌧=1
1
1+r⇤⌧
. This is equivalent to stock price or value max-
imization as can be seen from iteration on the Southern Household’s first order condition
for S⇤ft and insertion of the Southern household first order condition for B
⇤
t+1. At all times,
the innovation cost function is given by Z⇤ft =  
  ⌫M⇤ft+1
 A1  t ,   =
1
⇢ , ⌫ =
N  1
  .
Note that   2 [0, 1] is a parameter equal to the relative productivity of Southern firms to
Northern firms in the innovation of new intermediate varieties.
Trade Restrictions and Market Structure
The total mass of varieties At in existence in any period is made up of newly innovated
Northern varieties Mt, newly innovated Southern varieties M⇤t , as well as previously inno-
vated varieties. For one period after innovation M and M⇤ goods are sold under patent or
e↵ective monopoly protection. Previously innovated varieties are produced in a competitive
environment but split into two groups. A sequence of trade policy is given by fractions { t}
of o↵-patent goods is allowed to flow from South to North in mass It, while the remaining
fraction 1    t and mass Rt of o↵-patent goods is exogenously restricted to not flow from
South to North. The masses of varieties satisfy the following equations:
At =Mt +M
⇤
t +At 1, At 1 = Rt + It, It =  tAt.
Terms of Trade/No Arbitrage Condition
Northern and Southern intermediate goods trade at a relative price or terms of trade
qt in each period which translates pricing of each intermediate goods variety to the units
relevant for final goods sector optimization in each economy. This can be expressed as
pjt = qtp⇤jt.
Equilibrium Conditions
Given some sequence  t of trade restrictions, we now discuss conditions which characterize
the equilibrium of the economy above. First, the demand curve for each intermediate variety
is implied by profit maximization in the final goods sector, i.e. in equilibrium
xjt = (1  ↵) 1↵Hp 
1
↵
jt , x
⇤
jt = (1  ↵)
1
↵H⇤p⇤jt
  1↵ .
Competitive pricing of o↵-patent varieties, monopoly pricing of newly innovated vari-
eties, and the trade structure of the economy imply that prices for each good are given
by
pMt =
1 + rt
1  ↵ , p
⇤
Mt =
1
qt
pMt (Northern innovated M goods)
pM⇤t = qtp
⇤
M⇤t, p
⇤
M⇤t =
1 + r⇤t
1  ↵ (Southern innovated M
⇤ goods
pRt = 1 + rt, pR⇤t = 1 + r
⇤
t (O↵-patent trade-restricted R goods)
pIt = qt(1 + rt), pI⇤t = 1 + r
⇤
t (O↵-patent non-restricted I goods)
Let g˜t+1 =
Mt+1
At
and g˜⇤t+1 =
M⇤t+1
At
be pseudo-growth rates representing the ratio of
patents or new varieties created in the Northern and Southern economies in period t for
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first use in period t + 1 relative to the total mass of varieties available in period t. It
follows that the overall rate of growth of varieties in the global economy is given by gt+1 =
g˜t+1 + g˜⇤t+1. Furthermore, simplified version of the first order conditions for innovation
within the Northern and Southern intermediate goods firms can be written
g˜  1t+1 = ⌦(1 + rt+1)
  1↵ (H + q
1
↵
t+1H
⇤)
{g˜⇤t+1}  1    = ⌦(1 + r⇤t+1) 
1
↵ (q
  1↵
t+1H +H
⇤)
where ⌦ = ↵(1   ↵) 2 ↵↵ . Above, the interest rates in the Northern and Southern
economies are pinned down by the household first-order conditions with respect to the
one-period bond, i.e.
1 + rt+1 =
1
 
✓
Ct+1
Ct
◆ 
1 + r⇤t+1 =
1
 
✓
C⇤t+1
C⇤t
◆ 
The balanced trade condition in the economy can be written and simplified after sub-
stitution of intermediate goods demand and pricing as
MtpMtx
⇤
Mt = ItpItxit +M
⇤
t pM⇤txM⇤t
qt =
"
H⇤
H
g˜t(1  ↵) 1 ↵↵ (1 + rt)↵ 1↵
 t(1 + r⇤t )
↵ 1
↵ + g˜⇤t (1  ↵)
1 ↵
↵ (1 + r⇤t )
↵ 1
↵
# ↵
↵ 2
.
Consumption in each economy must satisfy a resource constraint, and below we list the
resource constraint for each economy as well as various simplifications of the output and
R&D terms which follow directly from the definitions of each technology.
Yt = Ct +Mt+1(xMt+1 + x
⇤
Mt+1) +Rt+1xRt+1 + Zt
Zt =
1
 
g˜ t+1At, Yt = H
↵
⇥
Mtx
1 ↵
Mt +M
⇤
t x
1 ↵
M⇤t +Rtx
1 ↵
Rt + Itx
1 ↵
It
⇤
Y ⇤t = C
⇤
t +M
⇤
t+1(xM⇤t+1 + x
⇤
M⇤t+1) +Rt+1x
⇤
Rt+1 + It+1(xIt+1 + x
⇤
It+1) + Z
⇤
t
Z⇤t =
   
 
{g˜}⇤t+1 At, Y ⇤t = H⇤↵
h
Mtx
⇤
Mt
1 ↵ +M⇤t x
⇤
M⇤t
1 ↵ +Rtx⇤Rt
1 ↵ + Itx⇤It
1 ↵i
These conditions jointly characterize the equilibrium of the economy with Southern
innovation, conditional upon the trade decomposition assumed throughout the paper which
requires Southern production of imported I varieties. For this to be consistent with cost
minimization by the Northern final goods producer, it must be the case that (1 + r⇤t )qt 
(1 + rt) at all times. Also, note that the assumptions on the timing or mobility of inputs
with respect to announcements of trade restrictions here follow the conventions of the Fully
Mobile economies discussed in the main text.
Steady-State Growth Path Conditions
By arguments identical to those contained within the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 in
Appendix A above, we can immediately see that in any steady-state growth path associated
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Table F1: Quantitative Exercise with Southern Innovation
Quantity Value
g  2.0%
g 0 2.7%
g˜  1.9%
g˜ 0 2.65%
q( ) 0.45
q( 0) 0.80
 W 35.6%
 W ⇤ 33.4%
Note: The variety growth rates and economy-specific pseudo-growth rates g and g˜ reported above
are translated to annual percentage rates. The Southern terms of trade q is expressed in proportions.
Quantities with subscript   ( 0) are calculated from the steady-state growth path associated with
trade policy   ( 0). The welfare gains from trade liberalization  W and  W ⇤ reflect the percentage
consumption equivalent gains from a trade liberalization   !  0 relative to remaining on the pre-
liberalization steady-state growth path with trade policy  , taking into account the full transition
path.
with a constant trade restriction   as well as a stable overall rate of global growth g = g˜+ g˜⇤
that each aggregate quantity in the model other than consumption must grow at the rate g.
This implies via the resource constraint of each economy that consumption itself grows at
rate g. This implies that interest rates along a steady-state growth path must be constant
and satisfy
1 + r = 1 + r⇤ =
1
 
(1 + g) .
At that point, we can write the innovation first-order conditions and balanced trade
conditions characterizing a steady-state growth path as
g˜  1 = ⌦ 
1
↵ (1 + g) 
 
↵ (H + q
1
↵H⇤)
{g˜}⇤  1    = ⌦  1↵ (1 + g)   ↵ (q  1↵H +H⇤)
q =
"
H⇤
H
g˜(1  ↵) 1 ↵↵
 + g˜⇤(1  ↵) 1 ↵↵
# ↵
2 ↵
.
Calibration and Quantitative Results
As in the quantitative analysis in the main text, we now wish to consider the response
of this economy to a trade liberalization shock. We follow the conventions of the Fully
Mobile case from the main text. We assume that the economy is moving along the steady-
state growth path associated with  s =   for all s  t. Then, in period t, we consider an
announcement of an unanticipated and permanent change in the trade restriction parameter
from   to  s =  0 for all s > t, where  0 >  . The objects of interest in this exercise include
not only the growth rates and terms of trade in the pre-shock and post-shock steady-state
growth paths (g , g˜ , g˜⇤ , q ) and (g 0 , g˜ 0 , g˜
⇤
 0 , q 0) but also the transitional dynamics of the
economy.
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Before analyzing the transitional dynamics of the economy, we must first fix the calibra-
tion of the underlying parameters, which include  ,  , ↵, H
⇤
H , H,  ,  
0, and  . Following
the logic laid out in the main text, we externally calibrate a ten-year per period economy
with the values of   = 0.9810, H
⇤
H = 2.96, ↵ =
2
3 , and   = 1. This approach leaves four
parameters left to determine: H,  ,  0, and  . We jointly calibrate the values of each of
the four parameters by targeting four moments drawn from OECD trade and production
data spanning the years of Chinese WTO accession as well as NBER data on patents filed
in the US. The data sources and calculations are described in detail in Appendix B above.
Implicit throughout this calibration exercise is a matching of the Northern model economy
to the OECD countries.
• The Northern pre-shock imports to GDP ratio in the model along the steady-state
growth path with parameter   is equal to the non-OECD imports to OECD GDP
ratio in 1997, i.e. IY   = 3.9%.
• The Northern post-shock imports to GDP ratio in the model along the steady-state
growth path with parameter  0 is equal to the non-OECD imports to OECD GDP
ratio in 2006, i.e. IY  0 = 7.0%.
• The pre-shock global growth rate along the steady-state growth path with parameter
  is equal to the rate of growth of real GDP per capita in the US from 1960-2010, i.e.
g  = 2.0%.
• The pre-shock ratio of Northern to Southern patents along the steady-state growth
path with parameter   is equal to the ratio of non-OECD patents filed in the US in
1997 to the total number of patents filed in the US in 1997, i.e. MM+M⇤   = 2.2%.
This calibration procedure is joint with no exact one-to-one correspondence between
moments and parameters. Intuitively, however, the trade ratios are particularly influential in
pinning down the values of   and  0, while pre-shock growth rates determine the scale of the
global economy as given by H. Finally, the patenting ratios are informative for the relative
productivities of Northern and Southern innovation technologies. The calibration procedure
results in parameter values of H ⇡ 2.80,   ⇡ 6%,  0 ⇡ 28%, and   ⇡ 8%. Although the
human capital level H is in model units di cult to interpret, the other parameters indicate
a liberalization from a regime allowing 6% of o↵-patent goods into Northern markets to
a regime allowing 28% of those goods into Northern markets. To match low Southern
patenting rates, the productivity of Southern innovation must be only 8% of Northern
innovation productivity.
Note that by contrast, calibration of the model without Southern innovation in the main
text to match the same import ratios required a much smaller trade shock from   ⇡ 10%
to  0 ⇡ 21%. The size of the trade shock is larger with Southern innovation because, as a
function of  , the curve of imports to GDP ratios shifts up and flattens. The curve shifts
up because of the additional M⇤ goods flowing from North to South. The curve flattens or
responds less to increases in   because the induced Southern terms of trade appreciation
results in lower Northern demand for Southern innovated goods, slowing import growth.
Once the calibration is complete, we compute the transition dynamics of the economy
following an approach entirely analogous to the one presented in Appendix C for the baseline
Fully Mobile economy. The main results of this quantitative exercise are given in Table F1.
Qualitatively, the addition of a Southern innovation capacity to the baseline framework with
fully mobile inputs changes little. Global growth increases from a pre-shock rate of 2.0%
annually to 2.7% with Southern innovation. In the economy without Southern innovation,
global growth increased from 2% to 2.37% in the long run. The substantially larger change
in growth rates in response to trade liberalization is entirely driven by the larger calibrated
trade shock  0     required in the economy with Southern innovation.
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Figure F1: Southern Innovation Model Trade Liberalization
Note: The figure displays the Fully Mobile transition path in the growth model with South-
ern innovation in response to a permanent, unanticipated trade liberalization from policy
parameter   to  0 >  , which is announced in period 0 to become e↵ective in period 1. In-
termediate goods firms may respond to the information about trade liberalization without
short-term adjustment costs. The solid black line is the transition path, the upper hori-
zontal solid blue line is the post-shock steady-state growth path, and the lower horizontal
dashed red line is the pre-shock steady-state growth path.
Over the full transition path plotted in Figure F1, which normalizes the period of the
trade shock to 0, we see similar dynamics as in the baseline Figure 5 without Southern
innovation. Trade liberalization leads to a rapid increase in the global variety growth rate
and the Southern terms of trade, while output growth rates converge more slowly to their
new and higher long-run levels. The gradual behavior of output growth rates relative to
variety growth rates is due to underlying and gradual movements in interest rates due to
consumption smoothing. Since interest rates determine pricing of intermediate goods, the
intensive margins of intermediate goods use and hence overall output growth are slower to
respond than the extensive margin or variety growth alone.
As in the baseline case without Southern innovation, the welfare gains from liberalization
are large. The consumption equivalent gain from liberalization, computed exactly as laid
out in Appendix C and taking into account the full transition path, are 35.6% for the North
and 33.4% for the South.
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